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ABSTRACT
Currently, networks and networked systems are essential media for us to com-
municate with other people, access resources, and share information. Reading (or
sending) emails, navigating web sites, and uploading pictures to social medias are
common behaviors using networks. Besides these, networks and networked systems
are used to store or access sensitive or private information. In addition, major eco-
nomic activities, such as buying food and selling used cars, can also be operated with
networks. Likewise, we live with networks and networked systems.
As network usages are increasing and popular, people face the problems of net-
work attacks. Attackers on the networks can steal people’s private information,
mislead people to pay money for fake products, and threaten people, who operate
online commercial sites, by bothering their services. There are much more diverse
types of network attacks that torture many people using networks, and the situation
is still serious.
The proposal in this dissertation starts from the following two research questions:
(i) what kind of network attack is prevalent and how we can investigate it and (ii) how
we can protect our networks and networked systems from these attacks. Therefore,
this dissertation spans two main areas to provide answers for each question.
First, we analyze the behaviors and characteristics of large-scale bot infected
hosts, and it provides us new findings of network malware and new insights that are
useful to detect (or defeat) recent network threats. To do this, we investigate the
characteristics of victims infected by recent popular botnet - Conficker, MegaD, and
Srizbi. In addition, we propose a method to detect these bots by correlating network
and host features.
ii
Second, we suggest new frameworks to make our networks secure based on the
new network technology of Software Defined Networking (SDN). Currently, SDN
technology is considered as a future major network trend, and it can dynamically
program networks as we want. Our suggested frameworks for SDN can be used to
devise network security applications easily, and we also provide an approach to make
SDN technology secure.
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
Currently, networks and networked systems are intertwined with our lives. A
student sends an email to deliver his report to a professor; a man shares his recent
photos with his parents, who live on different continents, through a social network
service; and a manager, who owns his e-commerce site, sells new basketball shoes
through the Internet. All of these activities can be observed easily around us, and
the networks and networked systems make our lives more productive and efficient.
As many devices that we use daily are connecting to network systems, we face new
threats that attack these systems. Attackers conduct different malicious operations
to steal money or just to show off their abilities. For example, an attacker may
reveal hosts that can be reached through a network and have certain vulnerabilities,
and can steal sensitive information, such as bank account numbers and confidential
documents, from the hosts. Moreover, an attacker can make web services fail in
handling requests from normal clients by sending a great number of fake network
packets to the services
Currently, such network attacks are major hurdles in building network environ-
ments that can make our lives better. If these attacks become more widespread and
common, people will hesitate to use network services. This will be a serious obstacle
in the development of networks in our lives.
Our research is motivated by this problem, and we ultimately intend to stop these
network attacks and make our networks more secure. To achieve this goal, we first
need to know about network attacks; thus, we must investigate how attackers operate,
infect hosts, and conduct malicious operations. By analyzing network attacks, we
can understand them, and this represents the starting point of research with the goal
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of defending our networks. However, it is very hard to survey all network threats
because they are so diverse. Therefore, in this research, we have decided to focus on
the analysis of some specific, serious network threats. Although this limits the scope
of the study, we believe that this can cover mainstream network threats and it can
help us reduce the effects of the most serious ones.
With the considerations mentioned above, we have selected bot malware as our
main target. Bot malware infects victim hosts, and it makes them be controlled by a
malware writer (we call this writer a bot-master). The bot-master controls infected
hosts to conduct different malicious operations. For example, a bot-master can
steal sensitive information from infected hosts, and he performs distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks to crash network services by controlling them. Even worse,
a bot-master can rent these infected hosts to another people who want to engage
in malicious operations. Renting bot-infected hosts can help a bot-master to make
money, and this is a great motivation to malware writers. Thus, recently, many
serious network threats have been initiated by bot-infected hosts controlled by a
bot-master.
Some previous studies have investigated bot malware, mostly focusing on analy-
sis of bot malware binaries, which is important work [91, 102]. However, since bots
have infected so many victims and have so much potential to damage the Internet,
they deserve much deeper study. By analyzing the state-of-the-art botnet, we can
gain more knowledge of current malware, for example, how it differs from previ-
ous generation malware and whether such differences represent future trends. Such
deeper investigations could also provide new insights into developing new detection
and defense mechanisms for current and future malware.
In this context, we first provide deep analysis on bot-infected victims in Chap-
ter I. In this chapter, we analyze infected victims by looking at recent popular bot
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malware - Conficker [96], Srizbi [95], and Megad [81], and we provide our findings
and new insights based on them. This chapter also compares the results of analysis
concerning each bot to provide more interesting results. We perform an in-depth
cross-analysis of different botnet types and show what similarities and differences
exist between them. Slightly contradictory to the hypothesis stated above, we report
that both types of botnets have a large portion of overlapped victims, and the overall
victim distributions in IPv4 space are quite similar. At the same time, they show
several distinct characteristics. To obtain a fine-grained understanding of these simi-
larities and differences, we further perform an in-depth set of large-scale passive and
active measurement studies from several perspectives, such as IP geographical loca-
tion, IP address population/density, network openness, and IP address dynamism.
The results reveal many interesting characteristics that could help explain the sim-
ilarities and differences between the two botnet infection types. More interestingly,
we demonstrate empirically that even if we only know some information about one
botnet (e.g., past botnet data), we can predict unknown victims of another botnet
(e.g., a future emerging botnet) with reasonably high accuracy, given that both bot-
nets use the same infection type (e.g., web-exploit). This sheds light on the promising
power of cross-analysis and cross-prediction.
Based on the results of the analysis, we devise a promising bot malware detection
system, and its prototype, called EFFORT, is presented in the second part (Chap-
ter II). This system detects bot malware by correlating the network- and host-level
characteristics of bot malware. Based on the intrinsic characteristics of bots, we
propose a multi-module approach to correlate information from different host- and
network-level elements, and design a multilayered architecture to efficiently coor-
dinate modules to perform heavy monitoring only when necessary. We implement
our proposed system and evaluated real-world benign and malicious programs run-
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ning on several different real-life office and home machines for several days. The
final results show that our system can detect all 15 real-world bots (e.g., Waledac,
Storm) with low false positives (less than 0.7%) and minimal overhead. We believe
that EFFORT raises the bar in the malware battle, and therefore this host-network
integrated design represents a timely effort in the right direction.
Understanding network threats and devising a malware detection system are both
important and necessary endeavors, which make many contributions when it comes
to removing network threats. However, they also have some limitations. We need to
keep investigating new network threats, and we should keep designing new defense
systems for new threats that emerge. Considering the relationships between attacker
and defender, this kind of approach may not be avoidable. Attackers keep developing
new attack methods, and defenders keep finding ways to defeat them. Is it possible
to stop this arms race, or at least reduce the burden of defenders?
It will be very hard to stop the progression of malware attacks and defense.
However, if we change our network environments with a focus on security, this can
help defenders to devise more effective and efficient systems to prevent attacks. This
is the second goal of this thesis; thus, we try to provide a new network architecture
that affords better security services than existing network environments.
Changing network architectures is not easy, and thus we need to identify an
efficient way do this. In this context, we find that software-defined networking (SDN)
is a good candidate technology, as it enables us to design new network environments
easily. SDN has quickly emerged as a new promising technology for future networks.
With the separation of the control plane from the data plane, thereby enabling
the easy addition of new, creative, powerful network functions/protocols, SDN has
attracted significant attention from both academia and industry. In academia, since
the publication of OpenFlow [62], which is a key component in realizing the SDN
4
concept, many research ideas based on SDN/OpenFlow have been proposed [67]
[73] [87] [9] [38] [85] [15] [88]. In industry, SDN is widely considered to be the
new paradigm for future networks, and many companies are deploying or plan to
deploy such technology in order to strengthen their network architectures, reduce
operational costs, and enable new network applications/functions.
Likewise, SDN has potential as a future networking technology, and we have
decided to use it to design our new network architecture with an emphasis on secu-
rity. Thus, we introduce a new security application development framework called
FRESCO, which represents our first step in making networks more secure. The aim of
FRESCO is to address several key issues that can accelerate the composition of new
SDN-enabled security services. It exports a scripting API that enables security prac-
titioners to code security monitoring and threat detection logic as modular libraries.
These modular libraries represent the elementary processing units in FRESCO, and
may be shared and linked together to provide complex network defense applications.
FRESCO currently includes a library of 16 commonly reusable modules, which
we intend to expand over time. Ideally, more sophisticated security modules can
be built by connecting basic FRESCO modules. Each FRESCO module includes
five interfaces: (i) input, (ii) output, (iii) event, (iv) parameter, and (v) action.
By simply assigning values to each interface and connecting necessary modules, a
FRESCO developer can replicate a range of essential security functions, such as
firewalls, scan detectors, attack deflectors, or IDS detection logic.
FRESCO modules can also produce flow rules, and thus provide an efficient
means to implement security directives to counter threats that may be reported
by other FRESCO detection modules. Our FRESCO modules incorporate several
security functions ranging from simple address blocking to complex flow redirection
procedures (dynamic quarantine, or reflecting remote scanners into a honeynet, and
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so on). FRESCO also incorporates an API that allows existing DPI-based legacy
security tools (e.g., BotHunter [34]) to invoke FRESCO’s countermeasure modules.
Through this API, we can construct an efficient countermeasure application, which
monitors security alerts from a range of legacy IDS and anti-malware applications
and triggers the appropriate FRESCO response module to reprogram the data planes
of all switches in the SDN network.
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2. UNDERSTANDING BOT MALWARE
2.1 Introduction
Botnets have become serious threats to the Internet. They send huge amount
of spam emails and perform DDoS attacks on popular web servers [41]. To perform
these attacks more efficiently and effectively, botmasters, who control botnets, keep
trying to recruit new victims. In their infection trials, two methods are popular:
network scanning and web-exploit. These two methods are quite different from each
other. Figure 2.1 (a) shows a botnet using the network scanning method (randomly
or with some local preference) to find new victims who have the same network service
vulnerabilities. If successful, it will try to install malicious binaries on them. This
approach is active and does not require any user operations (user-independent). In
addition, it can be considered a server-side vulnerability exploitation, because it
depends on opened (vulnerable) network services. In this work, we define this type
of botnet infection as Type I.
(a) Type I infection of scanning botnets (b) Type II infection of web-exploit botnets
Figure 2.1: Infection approaches of scanning and web-exploit botnets.
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In the case of a botnet using the web-exploit method (Figure 2.1 (b)), it finds
new victims by sending spam emails (or other social messages) which include URL
links pointing to malicious sites. If the recipient clicks the URL link, malware could
exploit browser vulnerabilities and be installed on his host automatically (a.k.a drive-
by download attack). This approach highly depends on user interactions (i.e. the
user has to click/visit malicious URLs in order to be infected). Thus, we consider
this web-exploit type of botnet infection user-dependent and relatively passive. It
can also be regarded as a client-side infection, because its infection depends on client
behaviors and browser vulnerabilities. In this work, we define this type of botnet
infection as Type II.
Several previous studies have made attempts to understand the characteristics
of botnets, becuase of their serious threats [107, 94, 55, 14]. These studies provide
interesting observations and insights. However we find that most these studies focus
on one botnet or one type of botnets (i.e., focusing on analysis of multiple botnets
employing the same infection approach).
This tendency lets us invoke a question of ”why is it hard to find some stud-
ies which compare multiple botnets employing different infection methods from each
other, when we can infer that botnets using different infection approaches show quite
different characteristics?”. The main reason might be difficulty of collecting and
analyzing large-scale data of multiple botnets. To collect large-scale botnet data,
we have to set up a data collecting system and it requires a lot of servers, network
devices, and other related equipments (e.g., power supply). It is not s simple job
and costs too much. Even if we can set up the data collecting system and gather
enough data, analyzing the data is another problem, because it is very hard to find
meaningful information from the data.
The main goal of this work is to provide a large scale cross-analysis of multiple
8
botnets, whose infection approaches are different from each other. In particular, we
intend to answer the following questions:
• Do these two types of botnets have different infection patterns, such as the
distribution of their victims? And how similar or different are they? From
the above description, it is reasonable to guess that they might have different
infection patterns given the fact that their infection vectors/methods are so
different. However, there is no prior work to confirm whether this hypothesis
is true or not.
• Why do these two types of botnets exhibit similar/different infection patterns?
If they have similarities, who are the common victims (that are extremely
vulnerable to both infection types)? If they have differences, why are some
victims more vulnerable to one infection type than the other one?
• What can we learn from cross-analysis? What new implications and insights
can we gain? How can they guide us towards new malware defense strate-
gies/techniques?
2.2 Data Collection and Term Definition
In this section, we provide information of data that we have analyzed and we
define several terms used in this work.
2.2.0.1 Data Collection
To understand the characteristics of different types of botnets, we have collected
data for three major botnets: Conficker, MegaD, and Srizbi. Conficker [96] is a
recent popular botnet known to have infected several million Internet machines. It
propagates automatically through network scanning. It first scans random networks
to find new victims and if it infects a host successfully, it scans neighbor networks
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of the host to find victims nearby [19]. Thus it is a representative example of Type
I botnets. The MegaD [81] and Srizbi [61] botnets are two recent botnets known
for sending large volume of spam since 2008. In particular, it is mentioned that
MegaD was responsible for sending about 32% of spam worldwide [81] and Srizbi
was responsible for sending more than half of all the spam in 2008 [72]. They are
representative examples of Type II botnets because they spread by drive-by-download
[81, 61] or pay-per-install methods [20].
The Conficker botnet data has been collected by setting up sinkholing servers
because Conficker uses domain-fluxing to generate C&C domain names for victims
to contact [96]. With the help of shadowserver.org, we have collected a large dataset
of Conficker infection including about 25 million victims [86]. The shadowserver.org
has set up several sinkhole servers and registered the domain names same as the
Conficker master servers to redirect queries of the Conficker bots to the sinkhole
servers. Then, the sinkhole servers capture the information of hosts contacting them
and the hosts can be considered as the Conficker infected victims.
Botnet Data Source Main Infection Vector # of Victims Collection Date
Conficker Sinkhole server [84] network scanning 24,912,492 Jan. 2010
MegaD Spam trap [8] drive-by-download or PPI 83,316 Aug. 2010
Srizbi Spam trap [8] drive-by-download 106,446 Aug. 2010
Table 2.1: Data summary of collected botnets.
The MegaD and Srizbi botnet data has been collected through the botlab project
[8], of which spam trap servers were used to gather information of hosts sending spam
emails. The detailed summary information regarding our collected data is presented
in Table 3.2. The botlab project captures spam emails from spam-trap servers and
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further investigates the spam emails through various methods such as crawling URLs
in the spam emails and DNS monitoring. From correlating the investigation results,
the botlab project finally reports which hosts are considered as infected by spam-
botnets such as MegaD and Srizbi.
2.2.0.2 Term Definition
Before we perform cross-analysis on the data, there are several important issues
to be addressed which can bias our result. The first thing is the dynamism of the
IP address of a host. Many ISPs use dynamic IP address re-assignment to manage
their assigned IP addresses efficiently [106]. This makes it hard to identify each host
correctly. This may cause some biases in measuring the population or characteristics
of the botnet [75]. Second, we are not likely to collect the complete data of certain
botnets but only parts of the data (e.g., MegaD and Srizbi), and this can also cause
some biases.
To account for these issues, instead of basing our analysis unit granularity on the
individual IP address level, we generalize our analysis to examine at the network/-
subnet level by grouping adjacent IP addresses. This will help mitigate the effect of
dynamism, because it is common that dynamic IP addresses of a host come from the
same address pool (subnet). Also, we believe that it is sufficient to examine subnets
because even if only one host in the network is infected, the neighbor hosts are likely
to be vulnerable or be infected soon [86].
In this work, we define our base unit for analyzing, i.e., “infected network”, as the
/24 subnet which has at least one malware infected host. Thus, if a sub-network is
infected by a Type I botnet, we call the subnet a Type I infected network and a similar
definition is also applicable to Type II infected networks. In addition, we define a
Common infected network as an infected network which has victims of both types of
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botnets. There may be some infected networks that are exclusively infected by either
Type I or Type II, which are defined as Type I EX or Type II EX infected networks,
respectively.
In our data set, we found 1,339,699 infected networks in the case of the Conficker
botnet, 71,896 for the MegaD botnet, and 77,934 for the Srizbi botnet. Thus, we have
data for around 1,339,699 infected networks for the Type I botnet and 137,902 infected
networks for the Type II botnet∗. From this we have identified 97,290 Common
infected networks.
2.3 Cross-Analysis of Botnet Victims
In this section, we provide detailed cross-analysis results of two types of botnets.
2.3.1 Point of Departure
We start our analysis with the following Hypothesis 1 that we proposed in Section
2.2.
Hypothesis 1. Since the two types of botnets have very different infection vec-
tors, they may exhibit different infection patterns (e.g., distributions of their infected
networks).
To verify this hypothesis, we measure how many infected networks are shared by
both types of botnets and how they are different from each other. The basic mea-
surement results are shown in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2(a) shows the distribution for
infected networks of each type of botnet over the IP address spaces (Type I (Con-
ficker), II (MegaD and Srizbi), and Common infected networks). Interestingly, the
distributions of Type I and Type II botnets are very similar to each other. Specifi-
∗There are 11,928 infected networks in common between MegaD and Srizbi.
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(a) Infected network distributions (b) Infected network diagram
Figure 2.2: Infected network distributions and diagram.
cally, the IP address ranges of (77.* - 96.*), (109.* - 125.*), and (186.* - 222.*) are
highly infected by both types of botnets and their shared regions (Common) are also
distributed in the similar ranges.
To investigate how many infected networks are “really” shared between them, we
draw a diagram which represents the number of infected networks of each type of
botnet and networks that they share in common in Figure 2.2(b). There are 97,290
Common infected networks, 1,242,409 Type I EX networks, and 40,612 Type II EX
networks.
Contrary to our expectation, the two types of botnets are distributed over similar
IP address ranges and there are many Common infected networks between them.
However, this observation is only about the distribution over the IP address space
and it is very hard to find semantic meanings such as their physical locations from
this result. For instance, even though we know a /24 subnet 111.111.111/24 is an
infected network, we may not understand who are using the subnet and where the
subnet is located. More importantly, why is the subnet more likely to be infected
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by certain type (or both types) of botnets? In addition, the ranges are too broad to
comprehend clearly. We show range (77.* - 96.*) is highly infected, but that does
not mean that all IP addresses in the range are infected, we need more fine-grained
investigation. Besides that, we also find that there are some differences between
them (i.e., Type I EX and II EX infected networks are still significant) and they also
need to be understood, because they can show which ranges are more vulnerable to
which type of botnet. Only considering IP address ranges might not clearly show
these differences.
Thus, we are motivated to consider more viewpoints that provide us some under-
standable meanings with fine-grained level semantic information. We have selected
four interesting viewpoints (we call them categories): (i) geographical distribution of
infected networks, which lets us identify more (or less) vulnerable locations and their
correlation with certain types of infections, (ii) IP address population/density, which
helps us understand relationships between the number of assigned IP address to the
country and the number of infected networks of the country, (iii) remote accessibility
of networks, which shows us how open (and thus possibly prone to infection) the
networks are and whether there is a correlation with certain infection types, and
(iv) dynamism of IP addresses, which tells us whether vulnerable networks use more
dynamic IP addresses and the correlation with infection type. In each category, we
build a hypothesis based on some intuition and then we perform a large scale passive
or active measurement to verify the hypothesis and gain some insights.
Insight 1. Interestingly, the two types of botnets are distributed in similar IP
address ranges despite of their different infection types. In addition, the ranges are
continuous and it might imply that vulnerable networks are close to each other. More
fine-grained analysis over the ranges might help us find new results and insights.
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2.3.2 Geographical Distribution of Infected Networks
In our first test, we have observed that two types of botnets seem to have similar
distributions over the IP address space. Thus, we could infer that the distributions
of two different types of botnets over geographical locations are similar to each other.
From this intuition, we make the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Type I and Type II infected networks are mainly distributed over
similar countries.
(a) Common (b) Type I and I EX (c) Type II and II EX
Figure 2.3: Infected network distributions over the countries (x-axis for country code,
y-axis for percentage)
To verify this hypothesis, we investigate how each type of infected network is
distributed over countries. When we observe the overall distribution of each type of
botnet over the countries, we find that all Common, Type I, Type I EX, Type II, and
Type II EX infected networks spread all over the world (with the exception of Africa),
but there are some concentrated areas. To analyze the result in detail, we select the
top 16 countries of each case and show their distributions in Figure 2.3. Results are
sorted by the number of infected networks of the countries. Here, X-axis represents
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the country code and Y-axis represents the percentage of each infection type, e.g., if
there are 100 Common infected networks overall and 14 infected networks are located
in Turkey (its country code is TR†), the percentage of Turkey is 14%.
In Figure 2.3(a), Common infected networks are mainly distributed in Asia (e.g.,
Turkey, Korea, Russia, China, and India) with more than 35%. Figure 2.3(b) also
presents that Type I and I EX infected networks are mainly distributed over Asia.
The distributions of Type I EX infected networks are quite similar to that of Type I.
The distributions of Type II and II EX infected networks are shown in Figure 2.3(c).
Here we still observe more than 30% as being located in Asia.
From the observations, we find two interesting things. First, the set of countries
that are highly infected are not very different for each type of botnet (i.e., if some
countries are highly infected by Type I botnet, they are also likely to be infected by
Type II botnets). This implies that these countries are more prone to be infected
regardless of infection methods. Second, there are some countries that are highly
vulnerable to one type of botnet over the other. China is a good example of this.
China has a lot of Type I infected networks. However, it has relatively small portions
of Type II infected networks. We presume that most of the networks in China are
accessible from remote scanning botnets because Type I botnets usually use network
scanning techniques to find new victims. We will test this in section 2.3.4 and show
whether our presumption is correct.
Insight 2. There are some countries which are prone to be infected by both types
of botnets. However, some other countries are more likely to be infected by one type
†Each country code represents followings; AR Argentina, AU Australia, BR Brazil, CA Canada,
CL Chile, CN China, CO Colombia, DE Germany, ES Spain, FR France, GB Great Britain, IN
India, IT Italy, JP Japan, KR South Korea, MX Mexico, NL Netherlands, PE Peru, PL Poland, RO
Romania, RU Russian Federation, SE Sweden, TH Thailand, TR Turkey, TW Taiwan, US United
States, VN Vietnam
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of botnet. Management policies of networks (e.g., network access control) could affect
malware infection of the country.
2.3.3 IP Address Population
From the previous result, we know that the infected networks of each type of bot-
net are concentrated mainly within several countries but the infection rates between
them are different. Why is the infection rate between them different? Are there any
possible answers or clues that might explain this? To find out some clues, we first
focus on the number of IP addresses assigned to each country.
IP addresses are not assigned evenly over networks or locations [40] [43]. In terms
of the IPv4 address space, there are some IP address ranges which have not been
assigned to users but registered only for other purposes, e.g., (224.* - 239.*) is as-
signed for multicast addresses [40]. In addition, IP addresses have been assigned
differently over locations, e.g., more than 37% of IP addresses are assigned to the
United States, while Turkey only has less than 0.5% [43]. From this fact, we can
easily infer that countries that have more IP addresses could have more chances to
be infected by malware leading to Hypothesis 3. Here, we will use the term of IP
address population to represent the number of assigned IP addresses and we define
high IP address population country as the country ranked in the top 30 in terms of
the number of assigned IP addresses, and low IP address population country as the
country ranked below 30. All ranking information is based on [43].
Hypothesis 3. Countries with more IP addresses (high IP address population
countries) might contain more of both types of infected networks than low IP address
population countries.
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Figure 2.4: Infected network distribution versus IP address population (x-axis for
percentage of assigned IP addresses to a country, y-axis for percentage of infection
of each type of botnet in the country)
To verify this hypothesis, we compare the number of infected networks of each
type of botnet with the number of IP addresses assigned to each country. The
comparison results are shown in Figure 2.4. We can see that the number of infected
networks of the Type I, II, I EX, II EX botnets are relatively proportional to the
IP address population (i.e., the more IP addresses a country has, the more infected
networks it contains). However, in the case of Common infected networks, they
are NOT proportional to IP address population. On the contrary, they are mainly
distributed over some low IP address population countries.
Intuitively, countries with more IP addresses have more chances to be infected.
Thus, we can easily accept the results of Type I, II, I EX, II EX. However, why do
some high IP address population countries have less Common infected networks while
some low IP address population countries have more? There may be several possible
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reasons for this. For example, the security education/knowledge of people may play
a role. People may open some vulnerable services or click suspicious URLs without
serious consideration, if they do not have enough education/knowledge of security
in some countries. Another possible reason is in regards to network management. If
networks in a country are well managed and protected very carefully, it is harder for
malware to find chances to infect the networks. Thus, malware infection rate would
not be proportional to the number of IP addresses in the country.
The other interesting point is the percentage of infected networks over all net-
works of the country (e.g., if a country has 100 networks and if 10 networks among
them are infected, the percentage of infected networks of the country is 10%). We
have observed that high IP address population countries are likely to have more in-
fected networks. However, it does not mean that most (or a high percentage) of
networks in the country are infected. For example, even though the United States
has more number of Type II infected networks than other countries (except Turkey),
the infected networks may only cover small percentage of all networks in the United
States, because the country has around 38% of IP addresses of the world. This can
reveal some low IP address population countries whose networks are more vulnera-
ble (in terms of percentage) than other countries and they could be ignored if only
considering the absolute number of infected networks.
To investigate the percentage of infected networks of each country, we have
used the data from the IP2Location.com report [43]. In the report, we find that
2,505,141,392 IP addresses have been observed in the world. This may not cover all
observable IP addresses in the world. However we believe that it is close to the real
value. Their report also shows the percentage of IP addresses that each country has
out of all observed IP addresses.
We use this data to calculate the number of IP addresses assigned to each country.
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Then, we calculate the number of /24 sub-networks of each country by dividing the
number of IP addresses assigned to the country by 256. At this time, we make an
assumption that “IP addresses are assigned to each country with the minimum unit
size of /24 subnet” to make our calculation easy. And we calculate the ratio of
infected networks in each country with it and the number of infected /24 subnets.
This scenario can be formalized as follows.
• Θ = the number of all IP addresses in the world (i.e., 2,505,141,392)
• j = the percentage of assigned IP addresses to the country j
• αj = the number of /24 subnets in country j
• γi = the number of infected networks of type i botnet (e.g., γ1 represent the
number of infected networks of Type I botnet)
• ηi = the percentage of infected networks of type i botnet in each country
Our goal is to calculate the value of η of each country, and this can be obtained
by the following formula (here j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 240}, and 240 denotes the number of
countries which have observable IP addresses).
• αj = Θ256 ∗ j
• ηi = γiαj ∗ 100, where i ∈ {1, 2}
The distribution of the values of η over some selected countries are shown in
Figure 2.5 2.7, and 2.7. This result is quite different from the previous result (in
Figure 2.3). In the case of Common (Figure 2.5), some top ranked countries in
Figure 2.3 show quite low η values. Russia, Korea, China, and the United States are
examples of this case, however Turkey still represents high η value. From the results,
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we can understand which countries are more vulnerable (i.e., high η value). Peru
is an interesting case. It has not been known as a country containing large number
of infected networks in our previous results. However large portions of its networks
in the country seem to be infected. Type I, I EX, II, and II EX also show similar
characteristics to the Common case and the results are shown in Figure 2.6 and 2.7.
Based on these results, we may focus on some vulnerable countries (e.g., Turkey
and Peru) to study infection trends of botnets. They may be good candidates for
monitoring in order to comprehend the infection trends of botnets.
Figure 2.5: Common case: η values of selected countries (x-axis for country code,
y-axis for η value)
Figure 2.6: Type I and EX case: η values of selected countries (x-axis for country
code, y-axis for η value)
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Figure 2.7: Type II and EX case: η values of selected countries (x-axis for country
code, y-axis for η value)
We try to reveal the reason why Turkey and Peru show high η values. From our
investigation, we find a possible reason. It can be caused by geopolitical reasons.
Some previous work pointed out that Turkey has been suffered from large cyber at-
tacks generated by its neighbor countries such as Russia [5]. This explanation is also
applicable to Peru, because it is surrounded by several countries that have a lot of
malware infected networks such as Brazil and Mexico.
Insight 3. To understand malware distributions, we might put our focus on not
only high IP address population countries with large number of infected networks, but
also some low IP address population countries where large portions of their networks
seem to be infected. Malware infection of these low IP address population countries
could be affected by geographical neighbors.
2.3.4 Remote Accessibility
Another category that we consider is the network openness or remote accessibil-
ity (i.e., whether a host can be directly accessed from remote hosts or not). As we
described in the previous section, one major infection vectors of the Type I botnet is
scanning remote hosts (or networks). Enterprise networks are usually protected by
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several perimeter defending systems such as firewalls, in an attempt to block mali-
cious threats from remote hosts. However, not all networks are protected as such and
if they are not protected, malware can infect internal unguarded hosts more easily.
From this intuition, we build the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. Networks that are more open (more directly accessible from re-
mote hosts) might have more infected networks of Type I botnets than that of Type
II botnets.
We have tested the network accessibility by sending several Ping packets (i.e.,
testing ICMP reachability) to 5 randomly selected hosts in a network. If any of our
Ping queries is successful in selected hosts, we regard that the network is reachable
from remote hosts, otherwise we regard that the network is unreachable. This test
has been already used before to understand the network reachability by previous
work [12]. Note that this test may only show the lower bound of reachable networks,
because some perimeter defending systems (e.g., firewalls) block incoming ICMP
packets, or our randomly selected hosts may be not alive during testing. In this test,
we assume that each /24 subnet have the same network access control policy (i.e., if
one of the host in the same /24 subnet is accessible from the remote host, we consider
that all hosts in the same /24 subnet might also be accessible).
In our test, we can access 54.32% of Type I infected networks, which is more
than half. This indeed shows that Type I infected networks are more open (remote
accessible). It confirms our hypothesis, although we presume this ratio could be
higher for Type I. This could be probably explained by (a) our network reachability
test is only a low-bound estimation, and (b) more networks are aware of malware
scanning attacks and thus more (previously open) networks installed firewalls. In the
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case of the result for Type II, it shows 46.85% networks are accessible, which is much
less than Type I. This is probably because the infection vectors of Type II botnets do
not depend on remote accessibility.
The result of Common is interesting, because it shows more than 60% of net-
works are accessible. This implies that remote accessible networks are much more
vulnerable to malware attacks. It might be reasonable, because even though network
accessibility may not help Type II botnets infect hosts, at least it helps Type I botnets.
In addition, we measure the remote accessibility of networks of three countries:
Turkey, China and the United States. These countries show somewhat interesting
patterns (e.g., China has a lot of Type I infected networks, but has relatively small
number of Type II infected networks). In our measurement, we find that 64.09% of
networks in China are accessible from remote hosts. This corresponds with our pre-
vious prediction (i.e., networks in a country that has a lot of Type I infected networks
might be more accessible from remote hosts) in section 2.3.2. We discover that 51.8%
of networks are accessible in the case of Turkey and 40.92% of the United States.
This result seems to be reasonable, because these countries are more vulnerable to
Type II than Type I botnets.
Insight 4. Open (remote accessible) networks are more likely to be infected,
particularly by Type I infection. However, it does not mean that inaccessible networks
are much more secure, because malware (Type II infection) can still infect hosts in
protected networks by several smart attack methods such as social engineering.
2.3.5 Dynamism of IP Address
Previous work has shown that a lot of bots used dynamic IP addresses [106]. We
want to investigate whether the networks with more dynamic IP addresses are more
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vulnerable than those with static IP addresses for both types of botnet infections.
Hypothesis 5. Places (or networks) with more dynamic IP addresses are more
prone to be infected by both types of botnets.
To understand this, we have analyzed how many infected networks are using
dynamic IP addresses. For the analysis, we apply the technique of finding dynamic
IP addresses proposed by Cai et al. [12]. In their analysis, they used reverse DNS
PTR records of each host. They believed that the reverse PTR record can represent
the status of a host and if some keywords of a reverse PTR record represent dynamism
of IP address, the host is likely to use dynamic IP address. For instance, if a reverse
PTR record of a host A is dynamic-host.abcd.com, it is very likely for the host A to
use dynamic IP address, because its reverse PTR record has a keyword of dynamic-
host. Note that this test only shows the lower bound of dynamic networks due to
the limitation of reverse DNS lookup and selected keywords. Even though this test
can not show all networks using dynamic IP addresses, it could give us information
of which type of botnet has more dynamic IP addresses. Based on this idea, we use
the same keywords mentioned in [12] to find hosts (and finally networks) which are
likely to use dynamic IP addresses. If we find any host in a subnet using keywords
representing the dynamism, we simply consider that the subnet uses dynamic IP
addresses.
We have measured how many infected networks use dynamic IP addresses and
the results are summarized in Table 2.2. The results are quite interesting. In the
case of Type I, I EX, and II EX we find that around 50% of infected networks use
dynamic and other 50% of infected networks use static IP addresses. However, in
the case of Common and Type II, infected networks use more dynamic IP addresses
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Type Dynamic IP Static IP
Common 62% 38%
Type I 50.1% 49.9%
Type II 58.4% 41.6%
Type I EX 49.08% 50.92%
Type II EX 51.87% 48.13%
Table 2.2: Comparison of the percentage of dynamic or static IP addresses of each
type.
than static IP addresses.
The result of Common matches the previous result [106] which mentioned dy-
namic IP addresses are more vulnerable. However, the result of Type I does not
fully match the previous result, i.e., Type I botnet infection does not have noticeable
preference on networks with more dynamic addresses. This is actually reasonable
because Type I botnets locate a remote victim by scanning the IP address space
regardless whether the target address is dynamic or static. In the case of Type II
botnet infection, we do observe infection preference on networks with more dynamic
addresses. This is also reasonable because there are probably more home users in
these (dynamic) address space who have less security awareness and potentially more
vulnerable computers and web browsing patterns.
Insight 5. Networks with more dynamic IP addresses are more vulnerable to
malware attacks. This is more noticeable in the case of Type II botnet infection than
Type I.
2.4 Neighborhood Correlation of Botnet Victims
In this section, we provide a prediction approach based on our insights obtained
in the previous section.
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2.4.1 Watch Your Neighbors
Insight 1 in Section 2.3.1 points out that both types of botnets have heavily
uneven distributions of infected networks and there are several heavily (continuous)
infected areas in some part of the IPv4 space. This implies that infected networks
of both types of botnets might be close to each other, i.e., it is very likely for them
to be located in the same or similar physical locations and neighbor networks (e.g.,
belonging to the same /16 networks). This intuition has already been discussed
before and verified in some previous work for some Type I botnet [19] [55] [86]. An
interesting thing is that one of the previous work provides an approach of predicting
unknown victims based on the intuition and it predicts unknown victims with more
than 90% accuracy with only employing a simple method (e.g., K-Nearest Neighbor
classification) [86]. However, this work has only focused on the case of Type I botnets.
The reason for strong neighborhood (network) correlation of Type I botnets is
intuitive, because Type I botnets will very likely scan neighbor networks to recruit
new victims. Then, can we apply a similar prediction approach to Type II botnets?
At first glance, this might not be the case because Type II botnets have very different
infection vectors/types from Type I botnets. However, we have also shown in the
previous section that the distributions of both types of botnets are continuous and
seems to be close to each other (in Figure 2.2(a)). Thus, it is hard to immediately
draw a conclusion whether similar neighborhood correlation could be found in Type
II botnets or not. Next, we plan to empirically verify this myth.
The previous work [86] has used the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) classifier which
is a very popular machine learning algorithm and it uses neighbor information for
classification. We also apply the KNN algorithm and select the same features for
the KNN classifier used in [86]: /24 subnet address and physical location of infected
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networks.
To perform this experiment, we first prepare data for representing the class of
benign and malicious networks. At this time, the infected networks of Type II botnets
can be used to represent the malicious class. However, since we do not have data for
the benign class, we also collect many (at the same scale as malicious networks) clean
networks‡ to represent it. When we collect benign networks, we intentionally choose
those which are close to infected networks in terms of the IP address and physical
location, and they could be also neighbors of infected networks.
After the preparation, we divide each Type II botnet data (MegaD and Srizbi)
into two sets for training/testing. And then, we apply the KNN classifier to predict
unknown infected networks.
As shown in Table 2.3, the prediction results are quite interesting. Even though
the prediction accuracy is lower than the case of Type I botnet (i.e., [86] reported
around 93% of accuracy), our predictor for Type II botnet (in both MegaD and Srizbi
cases) shows more than 88% accuracy with some reasonably small number of false
positives.
Botnet K Prediction Accuracy False Positive Rate
MegaD
1 88.35% 7.35%
3 88.25% 7.36%
5 88.14% 7.54%
Srizbi
1 88.20% 6.23%
3 87.70% 6.04%
5 88.30% 5.77%
Table 2.3: Botnet prediction results.
‡We checked whether they are clean or not by looking up several DNS blacklists.
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The results imply that Type II botnets also have the similar characteristics as
Type I botnets (i.e., if a host is infected, its neighbors are also likely to be infected).
Then, why does this happen? It may be very hard to find concrete answers or clues
for this question (unlike the intuitive explanation for Type I infection).
From our investigations, we could provide a possible answer. It may be caused
by its infection media. As we described before, one promising infection method of
Type II botnets is drive-by-download, which typically uses spam emails containing
links to compromised web sites, to trick people into downloading malicious binaries.
Thus, the infection pattern of Type II botnet might highly depends on who receives
spam emails. We find articles describing how spammers harness email addresses [76]
[26], and they point out that collecting mailing lists is one of their main tasks. It is
likely for mailing lists to contain email addresses belonging to similar locations (e.g.,
same company and same university). It implies that spam emails are delivered to
people who are likely to be close to each other and thus victims infected by spam
emails might also be close to each other.
2.4.2 Cross-Bonet Prediction
We have shown that if a host is infected by a Type II botnet, its neighbor networks
are also likely to be infected by this Type II botnet. When we perform this test, we
treat data of MegaD and Srizbi separately. However we know that these two botnets
are very similar in terms of infection vectors. To confirm the similarity of their in-
fected networks, we calculate a manhattan distance between the distribution of the
two types of botnets. The manhattan distance between two items is the sum of all
feature value differences for each of the all features in the item, and it is frequently
used to denote whether two data distributions are similar or not (e.g., if a distance
between data distributions of A and B is smaller than between that of A and C, A
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and B are closer to each other than C). It can be formalized as the following equation
(assuming that there are two items/distributions of x and y, and they both have n
elements).
Manhattan Distance =
∑n
i=1 |xi − yi|
We use the probability distributions of infected networks of Conficker, MegaD,
Srizbi over IP address spaces to measure the manhattan distance and we find that the
manhattan distance between Conficker and MegaD is 1.1427, Conficker and Srizbi is
1.1604, and MegaD and Srizbi is 0.8404. From the results, we can easily see that
the distance between the Type I and Type II botnet distributions is larger than the
distance between the two type II botnets distributions. This result shows that the
distributions of infected networks with the same infection type are closer to each
other than that of different types of botnet (i.e., infected networks of botnets in the
same type show very similar distribution patterns).
This result gives us another insight that if two botnets share the same infection
vectors (i.e., they are of the same type), we might predict unknown infected networks
of one botnet (e.g., a future botnet) with the help of the information of the other
botnet (e.g., historic data). This insight can be verified with a similar test that
we have done before. We can perform a test by simply changing the training and
testing data set to cross botnets. In the previous test, we extract the training and
testing data from the same botnet. However in this case, we use data from botnet
A for training and data from botnet B for testing. For example, when we predict
(unknown) infected networks of the Srizbi botnet, we use data of the MegaD botnet
for training.
The cross-prediction results are quite surprising. As denoted in Table 2.4, this
30
Botnet K Prediction Accuracy False Positive Rate
MegaD(train), Srizbi(test)
1 87.80% 7.41%
3 86.75% 7.49%
5 86.45% 7.69%
Srizbi(train), MegaD(test)
1 84.09% 6.53%
3 83.89% 6.31%
5 83.65% 5.09%
Table 2.4: Botnet cross-prediction results.
approach can predict unknown infected networks of the other botnet with more than
83% accuracy. This prediction accuracy is slightly less than what we observed pre-
viously. We believe that these results show us that even if we have no knowledge
of some botnets (e.g., a future emerging botnet), if we have some information of a
botnet whose infection vector is very similar to them§, we may be able to predict
unknown infected networks. To show a realistic example of application of the neigh-
borhood correlation, let us first assume that a network administrator knows historic
infected networks by Srizbi botnets. Then, he gets to know that the MegaD botnet
starts spreading but he does not have any information of which networks are and
will be infected. In this case, he can use the information of Srizbi botnet information
(e.g., victim distribution). Based on the physical location and IP address of victims
of Srizbi, he can predict future victim networks that will possibly be infected by
MegaD with a reasonably high probability.
2.5 Limitations and Discussions
Like any measurement/analysis work, our empirical study has some limitations
or biases. Even though we have collected a large amount of Conficker botnet data,
§Note that this is a very reasonable assumption because fundamental infection types of botnets
are very limited and do not change frequently.
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we have a relatively smaller amount of data for the MegaD and Srizbi botnets.
This might cause some bias in our measurement results and subsequent analysis. In
addition, the dynamism of IP addresses may lead to some over-estimation from the
collected data. To reduce some of the side effects, we generalize our analysis over a
network consisting of several adjacent IP addresses (i.e., measuring/analyzing over
/24 subnets instead of each individual host).
To discover interesting insights, we leverage some previous work. For example, we
use previous work to obtain how dynamic IP addresses are distributed over countries,
but the information is not complete, i.e., it does not cover all countries. However,
the provided information may help to uncover interesting cases (e.g., countries which
are highly infected by botnets), hence the information is still useful.
When we perform the test to find networks with dynamic IP addresses through
looking up reverse DNS PTR records of hosts in the networks, we may not collect
reverse PTR records from all hosts because registration of a reverse PTR record
is not always necessary. However previous work already verified the feasibility of
such kind of test [12], lending credibility to these results (at least providing a good
low-bound estimation).
2.6 Related Work
There are several studies of measurement or analysis of the Type I botnet victims.
CAIDA provides basic information about the victim distribution of the Conficker
botnet in terms of their IP address space and physical location [14]. In [55], Krish-
nan et al. conducted an experiment to detect infected hosts by Conficker. Weaver
[103] built a probabilistic model to understand how the Conficker botnet spreads via
network scanning. These studies provided useful and interesting analysis of the Con-
ficker botnet. Shin et al. provided a large scale empirical analysis of the Conficker
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botnet and presented how victims are distributed [86]. However, our work is differ-
ent from them in that we perform cross-analysis of different botnets and propose an
early warning approach based on cross-prediction. Even though [86] observed neigh-
bor correlation in Conficker, this work differs in that we empirically verified similar
neighborhood correlation in Type II botnets. In addition, we have proposed and ver-
ified cross-botnet prediction techniques to predict unknown victims of one botnet
from the information of the other botnet if they have similar infection vectors.
Measurement studies of the Type II botnet were also conducted. In [61], Mori
et al. performed a large scale empirical study of the Srizbi botnet. John et al. set
up a spam trap server to capture botnets sending spam emails [46]. This work also
showed the distribution of victims in terms of their IP addresses. Even though these
studies provided detailed analysis of some Type II botnet(s), they still differ from our
work in that they concentrate on a single (or one type of) specific botnet.
Some interesting studies from the analysis of Type II botnets have been also
proposed. In [20], Cho et al. analyzed the MegaD botnet and showed how it works.
Caballero et al. provided an interesting technique to infiltrate the MegaD botnet
and performed an analysis of its protocol [11].
Cai et al. measured how IP addresses are distributed over the world through
several interesting sampling techniques [12]. Our work leverages some of its results
but is different from their work in the main purpose.
2.7 Summary of this Chapter
In this chapter, we have collected a large amount of real-world botnet data
and performed cross-analysis between different types of botnets to reveal the dif-
ferences/similarities between them. Our large scale cross-comparison analysis re-
sults allow us to discover interesting findings and gain profound insights into botnet
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victims. Our results show fine-grained infection information and nature of botnet
victims. They show some interesting relationships between geopolitical issues and
malware infection, which might be the first work shedding light on this correlation.
This study can guide us to design better botnet prediction or defense systems.
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3. DETECTING BOT MALWARE∗
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we show the analysis results of bot infected hosts and
some new insights based on our findings. These analysis results and insights can guide
us to devise a new bot malware detection system, and in this chapter, we describe
an approach of detecting bot malware based on our experiences and knowledge from
our previous research (in Chapter 2). Before talking about the detection system, we
briefly survey the existing bot malware detection systems to understand their weak
and strong points.
To eradicate the threats posed by bot malware, a lot of research has been proposed
so far, and they fall into two main categories: (i) network-level detection and (ii)
host-level detection. Network-level detection approaches focus on network behaviors
of bots/botnets. They typically concentrate on finding common patterns of network
flows between bots and their botmasters (a.k.a C&C channels) [34, 32, 35]. Host-
level detection approaches investigate bot runtime behaviors mainly using system
call monitoring and/or data taint analysis [53, 92].
Both approaches have their own advantages and disadvantages in detecting bots.
Network-level detection approaches can detect different types of bots without impos-
ing overhead to the hosts, because they mainly monitor network traffic. However,
their limitations appear when they need to detect a bot communicating through en-
crypted messages or with evasion attempts [93]. Host-level detection approaches, on
the contrary, analyze suspicious runtime program behaviors in the host, so that they
∗Reprinted with permission from “EFFORT: A new hostnetwork cooperated framework for ef-
ficient and effective bot malware detection” by Seungwon Shin, Zhaoyan Xu, Guofei Gu, 2013.
Computer Networks, Copyright [2013] by Elsevier.
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can detect a bot even if it uses an encrypted communication channel. However, they
typically suffer from performance overhead because they need to monitor all invoked
system calls [53] at realtime and/or taint memory locations touched by the program
for information flow taint analysis [92].
After surveying both approaches, we have the following questions: (i) Is it possible
to design solutions consisting of strengths from both approaches? (ii) What kinds of
features/heuristics of each approach are helpful to build an effective system? and (iii)
Given these features, how do we combine them in an efficient way? If we can answer
questions of (ii) and (iii), then we could build a system that potentially answers the
first question.
We start with thoroughly examining prevalent bots to deeply understand their
intrinsic characteristics that they have regardless of their various implementations,
operations, and C&C communications. Knowledge obtained when we perform the
research described in the previous chapter, we observe the following invariants that
hold true for almost all bots. First, they are automated programs that are non-
human driven at the host side. Second, in order to be flexible and robust for C&C
purposes and detection evasion, they heavily use DNS tricks for rallying. For exam-
ple, they use dynamic DNS service, fast-flux service networks [39], or even domain
fluxing [91]. And again their DNS queries are non-human driven unlike most normal
programs. Third, in order to be useful, bots have to heavily access system resources.
For example, they will attempt to read/steal information in file systems, change
critical registry entries, or create new files/sockets. Finally, if we treat a networked
program as a communication information processing unit, most normal client pro-
grams (e.g., browsers) are intent to gain information. However, bot programs tend
to be more information leaking/losing oriented for most of their malicious activities
(and they tend to minimize incoming communication to minimize possible detection
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probabilities).
Observing the characteristics described above gives us new insights to detect
bot malware more effectively and robustly. For each characteristic observed, we
further investigate possible features or heuristics that contribute to effective and
efficient detection. Naturally, we need to collect, combine, and correlate essential
information at both host and network level. In particular, one unique feature of our
approach is the tight combination/correlation of both host and network information.
For example, we correlate network communications to corresponding programs at
host level. Thus, different from all existing network-based approaches with basic
analysis unit at per-host (IP) level, our granularity of network analysis can attribute
to more fine-grained per-process level. This itself provides many advantages such as
more accurate source attribution, and potentially more accurate detection results
because it avoids the possible ambiguity and unwanted aggregation/mixing of traffic
from all local programs.
To be more exact, at host level, we provide lightweight human-process-network
correlation analysis. We correlate human-computer interaction with each program,
and record correlated clues between network connections and running programs.
Further more, we can monitor system resource exposure patterns of suspicious pro-
cesses (e.g., those have non-human driven network communications). Our intuition
is that the exposure surface of system resources, such as files, registries, and network
sockets, is different between benign programs and bots.
At network level, we extract several different types of features. First, we build
a reputation engine to characterize a process’ reputation through examining “who
you are” and “whom you are talking to”. Our intuition is that the reputation of a
process could possibly be decided by the reputation of its social contact surface, i.e.,
reputations of communicated remote servers/hosts. This is intuitively sound because
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bot malware will communicate with “bad” server/host while good software tends to
communicate with “good” ones. Although a pre-established host reputation database
(or blacklist) is helpful, we do not require it as prior knowledge. Instead, we can use
anomaly-based features from DNS registration information. More importantly, we
want leverage community-based knowledge and intelligence by using public search
engines to locate information about certain communicated targets and then infer
their reputation. The interesting use of Google search engine was initially proposed
in [97] with great success for traffic measurement. We differentiate ourselves from it
in our different goal (for security purpose) and different use of features. Finally, we
also analyze network information trading rate for any process to infer how likely the
networked program is information gaining oriented or information leaking/outgoing
oriented.
In short, this chapter makes the following contributions.
• We propose a new host-network cooperated framework for bot malware detec-
tion with correlative and coordinated analysis. This design demonstrates an
important step from current state-of-the-art toward both effective and efficient
botnet detection.
• We implement EFFORT, a prototype system containing several novel modules
(e.g. process reputation analysis and system resource exposure analysis) to
cover bot invariants at both host and network levels. We investigate multiple
heuristics and features in these modules and we believe that they can capture
many of bots’ intrinsic characteristics.
• We evaluate our system on real-world data collected on several real-life lab/of-
fice and home machines for several days. Our results show that we can detect
all 30 malicious operations from 15 tested bots with no false positives and the
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overhead of our modules is negligible in our evaluation.
3.2 System Design
Figure 3.1: EFFORT design architecture, (M1 is for human-process-network correla-
tion analysis module, M2 for system resource exposure analysis module, M3 for process
reputation analysis module, M4 for network information trading analysis module, and
M5 for correlation engine)
Our system consists of five modules to cover previously mentioned bot character-
istics: (i) a human-process-network correlation analysis module, which analyzes the
interaction and correlation between human activity, process, and network connec-
tion, i.e., to know whether it is a human-driven network connection or bot-driven;
(ii) a process reputation analysis module, which characterizes reputation of a process
from the process itself (who you are) and its social contact surface (the commu-
nicated targets, i.e., whom you are talking to); (iii) a network information trading
analysis module, which monitors incoming/outgoing network traffic in order to in-
fer the information gain/loss without heavy load; (iv) a system resource exposure
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analysis module, which examines the system resource access patterns of a suspicious
process in detail; and (v) a correlation engine, which collects all analysis results and
correlates them to make a final decision whether the process is a malicious bot or
not.
Every module except for the correlation analyzer has a similar architecture. They
mainly consist of three elements; (i) sensor, which monitors network or process ac-
tivity, (ii) model generator, which creates a model of process or network behavior,
and (iii) detector, which decides whether each new action of a process or network is
anomalous or not. The overall architecture is shown in Figure 3.1 and each item in
Figure 3.1 will be explained in the following section.
3.2.1 Human-Process-Network Correlation Analysis
Since most running processes are benign, it is relatively inefficient to monitor all
of them in fine-grained detail (e.g., monitor system call level activities) all the time
to detect bots. If we can filter out all or most of the benign programs, we will not
waste our resource/time in meaningless investigation. Our human-process-network
correlation analysis module is designed to do this, i.e., sifting benign programs out.
This is based on an intrinsic characteristic of bot malware, i.e., bots are automated
programs that run without user interaction/notice, while most normal programs need
some human interactions.
Human-Process Interactions Monitoring: Keyboard and mouse are the
basic components that link human and the computer. If someone wants to send an
email using an email client program, he will type an email address and contents by
keyboard and click the send button through the mouse. Based on this intuition, we
monitor keyboard and mouse events of the host to understand which program has
human activity/interaction. To do this, our event sensor hooks Windows system calls
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related to keyboard and mouse events, and also determines which program generates
those events.
However, if a bot knows about our policy, it might imitate human behaviors and
create virtual events to confuse our sensor. To resolve this problem, our sensor also
checks whether the events come from actual physical devices or not. If the events
are resulted from physical devices connected via PS2 or USB interface, it trusts
them; otherwise it regards them as suspicious. Note that in current implementation,
we trust operating system and we believe it provides true information, a common
assumption widely used in this line of work. Of course, some malware (e.g., rootkit)
may infect operation system and deliver fake information. This issue could be solved
by using Hypervisor or TPM, as we discuss in Section 3.7.
Process-Network Interactions Monitoring: A connection sensor records
outgoing network connections from processes in a host. In particular, it cares about
one special network connection, DNS query. As briefly discussed before, botnets
heavily rely on using DNS for flexible, efficient, and evasive C&C rallying. They can
use fast-flux service networks [39] to frequently change the IP addresses associated
with one domain name, or even use domain fluxing [91] to frequently change domain
names. By monitoring these DNS queries, we can obtain valuable information later
in detection analysis, e.g., we can determine if they are human driven or not, and
furthermore we can even detect if there is fast-flux in use.
Interaction Model Generation and Automatic Connection Detection
: Combining information from the event sensor and the connection sensor, an
interaction model generator creates a model to describe which process has which
network correlations so that later we can link any given network flow to a specific
program/process in the host. The model simply uses time difference between the
time when a process issues a DNS query and the time when a process produces a
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mouse/keyboard event. We think that if the time difference is very small, the event
and the query can be considered as continuous operations and therefore human is
issuing the query. More formally, a DNS query time of a process can be defined as a
variable d and a recent keyboard/mouse event time of the process can be defined as
a variable e. Then we can create a model as following (if we assume that there are
n processes in the host).
if  > di − ei > 0, a DNS query of the process pi is human-driven, otherwise
bot-driven, where i is an integer ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and  is a threshold
However, in practice, this intuitive model may not work for all DNS queries
(but work well for IP address case). The reason is because some operating systems
provide helper functions of relaying a DNS query for other processes, e.g., Windows
uses the svchost.exe process for this purpose. Thus, with the above approach, we
will frequently find that DNS queries are sent from the svchost.exe instead of the
original program. To address this issue, we maintain a returned IP address(es) from
a DNS query (sent by helper processes), and observe successive outgoing network
connections to wait for the actual (original) program to connect to the returned IP
address(es)†.
This problem can be simply addressed by modifying the above model. If a DNS
query is issued by a helper process (the query time d), we will wait until we find a
process which contacts returned IP address(es) and apply the recent event time e of
the process.
†At this time, we do not need to monitor all network connections, we only monitor first packet
of each connection.
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3.2.2 Detecting Malicious Processes
With the help of the previous module, we can filter out benign programs and
only focus on some suspicious processes. However, there might be still some benign
programs that send automatic DNS queries. For instance, googleupdate.exe will au-
tomatically contact servers [30] to check update status [29]. We should differentiate
those benign processes from malicious processes using other features.
To do this, we perform a set of independent and parallel checks. First, we check
the reputation of the process and its social contact surface (the reputation of targets it
has communicated with). Second, we investigate the system resource access patterns
of the process. Third, we observe network information trading of the process. We
detail our design of these three modules as follows.
3.2.2.1 Process Reputation Analysis Module
A quick intuitive observation is that we could determine the reputation of a
process by not just looking at “who you are”, but also referring to “whom you are
talking to”. A bot malware will automatically contact some “bad” servers/peers in
order to be useful or controlled. Benign programs are relatively unlikely to connect
to “bad” targets automatically. Thus the problem of determining the reputation
of a process could be inferred by contacting social surfaces of the process and it
can be approximately reduced to the accumulation of “bad” communication targets
(domains). In the context of domain names, then we need to determine the reputation
of a domain name.
Domain Information Collection: We collect reputation information of the
domain by employing three types of sensors. First, we employ a whois sensor to
detect some anomaly features in its registration information, such as domain creation
date. Second, we use a blacklist sensor to investigate its previous records in well-
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known blacklists (e.g., SpamHaus [90], Google Safe Browsing [1]), which give us
relatively clear clues whether the domain has a history of malicious activity. Finally,
since blacklists might not be complete, we apply a search engine sensor to get another
heuristic which can leverage community-based knowledge and intelligence, i.e., ask a
search engine to infer the reputation of given domain name (IP address could work
too). It is motivated by the googling idea in [97].
At this time, we do not need to monitor all domains, since there are a lot of
domains which can be considered benign (e.g., google.com, bing.com and yahoo.com).
Thus, we can maintain a list of benign sites and our sensors do not need to check
connections to those domains for efficiency.
Data Normalization: Before applying collected data to a model creation, we
express it numerically and normalize it.
In terms of a domain registration information, we consider the following heuris-
tics: (i) whether the domain registration date is very recent (a lot of phishing and
botnet C&C domains fall into this type), (ii) whether the domain expiration date
is very soon (malicious domains typically come and go quickly and they do not reg-
ister for a long time), (iii) number of registrars (typically very small for malicious
domains). We simply use numeral values to represent each feature as shown in Table
3.1.
In the case of the blacklist, it is very obvious that if a domain can be found in
blacklists, it is suspicious. We give “0” if it is in blacklists, otherwise “1”.
To leverage community knowledge by using search engines like Google, we con-
sider the following simple heuristics: (i) whether the domain name is well-indexed
(thus returning many results), (ii) in the top returned web page results, whether the
domain name and the process name are frequently used in a malicious context, e.g.,
they are surrounded by malicious keywords such as bot, botnet, malware, DDoS,
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attack, spam, identity theft, privacy leak, command and control (C&C). Again we
use numeric values to represent these heuristics as shown in Table 3.1. Typically,
contents of returned search results include three different types of information: (i)
the title, (ii) the URL, and (iii) the relevant snippet of the returned web page. We
treat each type as different features, and we assign “1” if returned contents (title,
URL, and summary) include the queried domain name. We inspect the returned
results to see whether there are any malicious keywords or not. If there are any, we
give “0” for its value.
Feature Numerical Values
Domain Creation Date Current Date - Creation Date
Domain Expiration Date Expiration Date - Creation Date
Number of Registration Number of Registration
Blacklist if NOT in any blacklist it is 1, otherwise 0
Web Search Engine Results
(title, URL, summary, mali-
cious keywords)
The title, URL, and summary are 1 if we find
the domain/process name in each item, oth-
erwise 0. The malicious keyword is 1 if we
can not find any malicious keywords from the
returned pages, otherwise 0
Table 3.1: Numerical value of the selected features of domain reputation analysis
module.
The features related to returned results by a search engine and blacklist are al-
ready normalized, i.e., their values are between “0” and “1”. However, features of
domain registration can be varied dynamically. To make their values range between
“0” and “1”, we employ a gaussian normalization approach. It regards a distribu-
tion of data as gaussian function and maps every data point into the probability of
gaussian function.
Process Reputation Model Creation: Now, we have normalized values of
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the features, then all that remains is to build a model based on them. We employ a
Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier [21] for the process reputation model. The
SVM classifier maps training examples into feature spaces and finds (a) hyperplane(s)
which can best separate training examples into each class.
Here we briefly talk about the SVM classifier.
To start with the simplest case, we assume that there are two classes and they
can be separated by a linear function. More formally, given training examples xi
and a classifier yi, if we assume that those two classes are denoted as 1 and −1 (i.e.
yi ∈ {−1, 1}), the training examples which lie on the hyperplane satisfy the following
equation.
w · x+ b = 0, where w is a normal vector and b/||w|| is a perpendicular distance
from the hyperplane to the origin.
From the above equation, we can find the hyperplanes which separate the data
with maximal margin by minimizing ||w|| under the constrains of yi(xi ·w+b)−1 ≥ 0.
To solve this equation, we will apply a Lagrangian formulation, and then we will have
a primal form - Lp - of the Lagrangian [10]. It is described as the following equations.
Lp ≡ 1
2
||w||2 −∑αiyi(xi · w + b) +∑αi (3.1)
, where αi is a Lagrangian multiplier and αi ≥ 0.
Now, we have to minimize Lp with respect w and b, and it gives us two conditions
of w =
∑
αiyixi and
∑
αiyi = 0. In addition, we can substitute these conditions into
Lp, since they are equality in the dual formulation. Thus, we can get dual form - Ld
- of the Lagrangian like the following equation.
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Ld =
∑
αi − 1
2
∑
αiαjyiyjxi · xj (3.2)
Finally, we can get our SVM classifier through maximizing Ld. If we can not
separate the data by a linear function, we have to extend the original set of training
examples xi into a high dimensional feature space with the mapping function Φ(x).
Suppose that training examples xi ∈ Rd are mapped into the euclidean space H by
a mapping function Φ : Rd → H, we can find a function K such that K(xi, xj) =
Φ(xi) · Φ(xj) (a.k.a. ”kernel function”). We can replace the inner-product of the
mapping function by the kernel function and solve the problem with similar approach
of the linearly separable case.
In this model, we consider that the normalized features, which are mentioned
above, are training examples. In addition, we define that there are two classes -
benign and malicious - in this model, thus the normalized features will represent one
of the two classes.
Finally, we will find (a) hyperplane(s) which can best separate training examples
into each class. Then, we can obtain a SVM classifier for the process reputation
model.
Anomalous Process Reputation Detection: After creating a model of pro-
cess reputation, we apply contacting domains of testing processes to the model. It
is very frequent that a process contacts several different domains during a certain
period. Thus, we apply all contacting domains to the model, and determine whether
(a) “bad” domain(s) (i.e. classified as a malicious domain) exists or not. If there
is (are), we consider the process reputation as bad (malicious), otherwise it is good
(benign). More formally, if a process visits m different domains during T seconds,
the detection result is represented as following (We define that yi is for a classifier,
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+1 for a “benign class”, and −1 for a “malicious class”).
If there is any domain di satisfying yi(di) = −1 in the contacting domains of a
process, the process is malicious (where i ∈ {1, 2, ..,m}).
3.2.2.2 System Resource Exposure Analysis
If a bot infects a host, it usually tries to do something useful for its master (to
make profit), e.g., stealing information, sending spam, and launching DDoS attacks
[42]. Common characteristics of these operations are that they will consume system
resources - memory, cpu and network - of the host, read/modify some system files
or registries, and/or steal sensitive information of the owner [57]. If we can monitor
how system resources (e.g., files, registries and network sockets) are exposed to this
process (and to what degree), we could infer these anomaly access patterns.
System Resource Exposure Patterns Monitoring: A system resource
exposure sensor monitors resource access activities of a process, which is considered
to issue an automatic outgoing connection, and stores this information. It mainly
observes how the process access files, registries, and network sockets.
System Resource Exposure Model Creation: To build this model, we use
the following heuristics: (i) typically normal processes rarely access files in other
user’s folders and system directories, (ii) typically normal processes do not modify
critical registries (with a few exceptions), and (iii) typically normal processes do not
create a large number of sockets in a short time period. These heuristics are not
perfect, i.e., some normal processes might have some of these patterns. Our goal
of this module is not to have zero false positive, instead, we want to detect most
of these system-resource-consuming malware (since for a botmaster, the purpose of
controlling a bot-infected machine is to turn the machine into his resource for profit).
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Thus, we think our heuristics are reasonable.
More specifically, these heuristics can be represented as following events Yi of a
process:
• Y1, access files in other user’s folders
• Y2, access files in system folders
• Y3, modify critical registries
• Y4, create a new process
• Y5, create network sockets more than threshold θ
At this time, most events are very clear to understand, however the event Y5
needs a clearer definition to avoid confusion. We employ a time window, whose size
is w seconds, for event Y5, and we measure the number of network socket creations
(defined as m) during the time window. Then, we calculate the unit number of
network socket creations by dividing m by w. We will use this unit value when we
measure the event Y5 (i.e. the event that unit value is larger than σ).
To build a system resource exposure model, we also employ a SVM classifier.
However, this model is different from the previous model of a process reputation. In
the case of the process reputation model, we have two classes (benign and malicious),
since we could easily obtain both classes of information (i.e. benign domains from
contacting domains of normal users and malicious domains from several third parties,
such as [60]). Here we mostly have one side of information - benign processes. To
get ground truth information of the system resource usages of malware is tricky,
some malware may refuse running or behave normally. In addition, they may behave
differently, when they are not in control by a bot-master. Thus, even though we
obtain the information of malware, it may not represent its behavior clearly. To
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address this issue, we only use the processes of known typical (benign) programs.
Hence, in this model we consider that we may have only one class of data.
The One-Class SVM (OCSVM) has been proposed to create a model with only
one side of information [80]. In this work, we use OCSVM to build the system
resource exposure model. The OCSVM maps training examples into a feature space
and finds a hyperplane which can best separate training examples from the origin.
For instance, given training examples xi, if we assume that there are two planes
denoted as “+” and “-” across an origin, the OCSVM will assign all known examples
xi into an one of the planes (i.e. “+” plane or “-” plane).
Similar to generic multi-class SVM classifier, the OCSVM needs to find a hyper-
plane with maximal geometric margin and it is described as solving the Lagrangian
equations of (1) and (2) in the above section (more details about the OCSVM can
be found in [80]). In this model, we will find a hyperplane to assign all benign ex-
amples (i.e. the Yi features of the benign processes) into the “+” plane and anomaly
examples into the “-” plane.
In this model, we will find a hyperplane to assign all benign examples (i.e. the
Yi features of the benign processes) into the “+” plane and anomaly examples into
the “-” plane.
Anomalous System Resource Exposure Detection: After creating the
model of the system resource exposure, we apply system resource exposure patterns
of new processes to the model. If a value of the mapped result of testing data is
assigned to “-” plane, we regard the process as anomalous, otherwise it is normal.
3.2.2.3 Network Information Trading Analysis
Typically, most programs will act as clients rather than servers, and most pro-
grams will try to gather information rather than distribute information. That is, if
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we treat a program as a communication information processing unit, normal client
programs are more likely to be an information gaining process. However, a bot will
behave differently. Usually, the data that a bot receives is a command from a bot-
master, therefore the amount of the data may be small (to minimize the chance of
being detected), however the data, which a bot typically sends, will be relatively
large as it performs malicious operations in the network. Information theft, DDoS
attack, and massive spam sending are good examples.
Lightweight Network Traffic Monitoring: To observe network information
trades, a network sensor captures network packets between a process and a contacting
domain and stores them. An important thing in here is that this sensor monitors
network traffic generated by a process not by a host. It could give us more fine-
grained observations of network information trading. Our sensor is very simple and
lightweight, since it does not need to analyze payload contents and it is not affected
by encryption used by bots.
In addition, we monitor the host level network connections to obtain aggregated-
view of network information trading. At this time, the sensor only measures the
number of outgoing connection trials (i.e. TCP SYN packets and first UDP packets).
We believe that this aggregated view gives us a good clue to find DDoS, network
scan, or massive spam mail sending.
Network Information Model Creation: We use a simple method to model
the network information trade rate, i.e., the ratio of incoming and outgoing pack-
ets/bytes exchanged between a process and a remote site in a certain period. We
define the number of incoming and outgoing packets as θ1 and θ2, and the number
of incoming and outgoing bytes as δ1 and δ2. Thus, each ratio can be represented as
θ1
θ2
and δ2
δ2
.
To observe an aggregated-view, we employ a time window wi for each host i. We
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measure how many network connection trials happen in the time window.
Anomalous Network Information Trading Detection: In the case of
the fine-grained view, if one or both of the predefined ratio values of a process is
(are) smaller than some threshold γ1 (for packet) and γ2 (for bytes), we consider the
process anomalous, otherwise normal. Also, we consider the network behavior of the
host is anomalous, if a host creates network connection trials more than a threshold
τ .
3.2.2.4 Correlation Engine
After each module makes its own decision, the correlation engine will combine
these results and make a final decision using a weighted voting system. At this time,
we should determine the weights of the decision of each module.
We can also employ a SVM classification technique to let us know which element
(i.e. decision result of the module) is more important (i.e. should have more weight).
To apply the SVM technique, we need training examples of both sides - malicious
and benign. However, here is also same issue with the system resource exposure model
creation mentioned in Section 3.2.2.2. It would be relatively difficult to collect the
information of the malicious side. Thus, we decide to employ OCSVM to determine
the weight. The way how to determine the weights is same as the method explained
in Section 3.2.2.2.
3.3 System Implementation
In this section, we will explain how we implement each module.
3.3.1 Host-Level Modules Implementation
Our human-process-network correlation analysis module captures the mouse and
keyboard events using Windows system functions. Basically, Windows provides func-
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tions to capture the events from external devices [66]. Using these APIs, we imple-
mented the event sensor which identifies which process generates the events. We also
added the function to store captured information (prcess, event time) to the Shared
Memory area.
To capture the outgoing DNS queries, TCP SYN, and UDP packets, we used the
WinPcap library [104]. It provides functions to collect raw level network packets
on the Windows OS, with little overhead. Moreover, connection sensor does not
monitor all network packets, but monitor only DNS, TCP SYN and UDP packets.
It also reduces the overhead, since those packets comprises a small portion of the all
network packets.
Whenever there are network events we should capture, our module also identifies
which process produces them and verifies whether the process is related to the human
actions or not. However, if a process uses a helper process for a DNS query, we could
not directly use it sometimes. To address this problem, we check the process which
produces the DNS query automatically and if it is a helper process (e.g., svchost.exe),
the module waits a DNS reply which contains a IP address of the domain. Then, if
there is an automatic connection from a process to that IP address after a DNS query,
the module sees that the process issues a DNS query. We use GetExtendedTcpTable
and GetExtendedUdpTable functions to recognize which process creates the connec-
tions. If we see the TCP or UDP connection, we will call these functions to identify
which process acquires the source port number of the connection.
We implemented the system resource exposure analysis module based on Easy-
Hook [24]. EasyHook is a successor and enhanced version of Detours [22], and it
provides an interface letting us perform Windows API hooking. The hooking ability
allows us to observe how a process works and which system calls are invoked by the
process. We selected 28 system calls to understand the exposure patterns of the
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process. The selected system calls are related to the access of the system resources,
such as files, registries, network sockets, and creation of a process. In addition, we
employ TinySVM library [56] to create the system resource exposure model.
3.3.2 Network-Level Modules Implementation
To gather network features, the process reputation analysis module should utilize
multiple network services such as, whois services, blacklist identification services, and
web searching services. Whenever the module receives a suspicious process and its
contacting domains, it sends a query to multiple network services to gather network
features. Also, we use TinySVM library [56] to create the process reputation model.
For a network information trading analysis module, we build a function to capture
network packets using pcap library.
3.3.3 Correlation Engine Implementation
We have implemented the correlation engine as an independent process and it
will wait for a message from each detection module, and finally decides whether the
process is malicious or not. We also use TinySVM library [56] for the correlation
engine.
3.4 Benign Data Collection and Detection Model Training
In this section, we will show how we collect real world benign data and how we
train detection models based on collected data.
3.4.1 Data Collection and Usage
We have installed our modules into six different real-life hosts which are used in
the office or home and collected the information of process activities and network
behaviors for several days. The collection has been done in working hours on business
days. We carefully examine to make sure that there are no malicious programs
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(especially bot) in the hosts, thus we consider that the collected data can be used
for benign examples. The summary of the data set is represented in Table 3.2.
As shown in the Table 3.2, during the data collection, 86 programs have initiated
85,462 connection trials in total and each host initiated from 37 to 331 connections
per hour. In addition, we have collected the system call traces of 78 running pro-
cesses. Since collecting system call traces can make a system slow, we do not collect
system call traces all the time, we randomly select current working processes in each
time interval (mainly business hours) and record their system call traces.
We have split the whole data set into two parts based on time-line; (i) first 70%
for training our models - SET-1 and (ii) later 30% for testing of false positives -
SET-2. SET-1 contains 62 processes and 84,614 connections and SET-2 has 16
processes and 848 connections. In this Section, we only use SET-1 for training and
verifying our detection models. We will use SET-2 in Section 3.5.3 for false positive
testing.
Host Usage Programs Network Connection
Trials
Collection Time
1 Office 7 252 3 hours
2 Office 16 7,859 69 hours
3 Office 19 5,740 147 hours
4 Office 9 5,098 139 hours
5 Home 27 55,586 168 hours
6 Home 8 10,927 83 hours
Table 3.2: Data set summary. (Programs represent the number of programs related
to network connection trials)
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3.4.2 Automatic Connection Analysis
The human-process-network correlation analysis module detects 18,144 automatic
connections out of 84,614 connections in total and they are 21.44% of all network
connections. When we detect automatic connections, we set the threshold  of the
human-process-network correlation analysis module to 1 second.
We investigate which process generates automatic connections, and we observe
that most automatic connections are issued by Windows system processes or web
browser processes. The svchost.exe, spoolsv.exe, and taskeng.exe are the Windows
system processes handling network or printing services and they generate 37.73% of
automatic connection trials. In the case of the web browsers, the iexplore.exe, which
is an instance of the Internet Explorer browser, and chrome.exe, which is an instance
of the Google Chrome browser, are the main sources, and they produce 29.48% of
automatic connection trials.
Next, we examine why they generate large number of automatic connection trials.
The automatic connections from the Windows network service processes are mainly
for sharing resources such as network printer and sharing folders. In the case of
the browser processes, they mainly contact well-known web sites or trustworthy web
mail sites, such as Google, Yahoo, Google mail (Gmail) and university mail sites to
check updated information. Interestingly, they also contact on-line advertisement
sites such as AdSide [2] very frequently.
Besides this, there are some other processes producing automatic connections
frequently. The vmnat.exe, which is an instance of VMWare virtual machine [99],
relays network requests issued by its guest OS, and most requests are generated by
browsers in the guest OS. The devenv.exe is a process of Visual Studio 2010 program
whose main purpose is developing Windows application programs, but it contacts
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Microsoft Developer web sites very frequently. The ExpressService.exe is a process
of a network storage application program, and it frequently contacts storage hosting
sites.
After surveying, we think that we could ignore some automatic connections con-
tacting explicitly benign remote hosts. In the case of the Windows system processes,
we can ignore automatic connections heading to local networks, since it is nearly
impossible that a bot-master runs a server in the local network. In addition, we may
ignore automatic connections visiting trustworthy web sites such as Google, Yahoo,
and Gmail.
Based on this idea, we create a whitelist of domain names to reduce unnecessary
costs of our system. If an automatic connection tries to contact domains in the
whitelist, we consider it benign. To reduce the effect of the whitelist, we only main-
tain 10 well-known web sites. It has 5 search engine web sites, 3 web mail sites, 1
university site and 1 multimedia site. All sites except for 1 university site are ranked
in the top 400 by Alexa [6].
By removing connections to local networks and web sites in the whitelist, we
finally have 5,309 automatic connections to 131 different domains, which is 6.27% of
all network connection trials.
3.4.3 Process Reputation Model
From the collected data, we find that these processes have contacted 7,202 differ-
ent domains. In order to create the process reputation model, we extracted features,
which are listed in Table 3.1, from these domains. At this time, we consider that all
collected domains are benign, hence we will use them to represent the benign class.
We also need malicious domains to represent the malicious class. For the malicious
class, we have collected recent 150 malicious domains from [60], and also extracted
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features.
Using collected features, we train a SVM classifier for the model. When we train
the SVM classifier, we use a RBF (radial basis function) and polynomial as the kernel
function.
We validate the model to comprehend how it works. To do this, we first divide
our collections of benign and malicious data into training and testing set. Then, we
create a model by applying training set and evaluate the model by applying testing
set. We change the rate of training and testing data set to evaluate our model more
clearly.
Figure 3.2 presents a detection rate and a false positive rate of the process rep-
utation model. As shown in Figure 3.2, our model can detect both malicious and
benign domains around 99% of rates with very low false positive rates (sometimes
0% of false positive).
(a) detection (b) false positive
Figure 3.2: Process reputation model - detection rate and false positive rate
From this result, we decide that we use the RBF function for the kernel function
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for our process reputation model, since it shows around 99% detection rate and has
very low false positive rates.
3.4.4 System Resource Exposure Model
We analyzed system resource exposure patterns of normal (benign) processes
to create the system resource exposure model. Here, we will only use information
of benign processes and employ a OCSVM classifier to build the model. To do
this, we use 62 collected benign processes information. The representative benign
processes are the instances of browsers (Chrome, Firefox, and Internet Explorer),
mp3 playing programs (Winamp, Gom Player), and p2p client program (Emule).
We have extracted each feature defined in Section 3.2.2.2 from them.
Like the approach mentioned in the process reputation model creation, we also
divide our data set into training and testing set. The training set is used to build
an OCSVM classifier and the testing set is applied to evaluate the obtained OCSVM
classifier. We use a RBF function for a kernel function.
We measure a detection rate and a false positive rate of the system resource
exposure model and present results in Figure 3.3. When we use more than 80% of
the collected data for a training, our system resource exposure model can classify all
the testing data without any error. Thus, our classifier has no false positive in this
case.
3.4.5 Network Information Trading Model
We analyzed the network flow patterns and verified that most benign programs
act as clients not as servers. We measure the ratio between incoming packets (or
bytes) and outgoing packets (bytes).
When investigating our data set, we found 92.6% of flows get more packets from
the remote host. In the case of bytes, only 81.87% of the connections grab more byte
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(a) detection (b) false positive
Figure 3.3: System resource exposure model - detection rate and false positive rate
from the remote host. The processes, which send more data to remote servers, are
applications of updating data and browsers. We tried to understand why they send
more information to remote servers, however unfortunately, we could not reveal the
reason behind this, since we do not capture payload contents (because of privacy
issues). However, we can infer the reason from their main purpose, we think that
they may send current status of applications for update.
We can apply the ratio of the incoming and outgoing packets to discriminate a
malicious process from a benign process. It is very obvious that if a bot delivers its
own information to a master, the ratio can detect them easily.
We investigate the number of network connection trials of a host. To do this,
we find what is the maximum network connection trials of a host in a certain time
window. We set 10 seconds for a time window and investigate our data set. We
find that 21 connection trials (in 10 seconds) are the maximum number. Based on
this result, we can set the threshold τ , in this experiment we will use 42 (double the
experimental result) for the threshold τ .
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3.4.6 Correlation Engine
To calculate weights for the correlation engine, we select 27 benign processes,
which produce automatic connections frequently. Most of them are processes of
browser, multimedia application, and p2p client programs. We collect their detection
results which are performed by our detection modules. Then, we train a OCSVM
classifier using the collected results and determine the weights.
3.5 Evaluation
In this section, we will provide the results of evaluating the EFFORT system. In
order to present the effectiveness clearly, we test each individual module and show
how our system finally combine results of each module and make a final decision. In
addition, we measure the performance of each module to determine the efficiency of
our system.
3.5.1 Test Environment and Data Set for Botnet Detection
We build an isolated virtual environment to run our test. The environment
consists of three virutal machines which individually served as an infected host,
a controller and a monitor machine. All of them install Windows XP SP3 operating
system with basic software installed, such as Internet Explorer browser and Microsoft
Messenger.
The virtual network environment consists of three virtual machines which indi-
vidually served as an infected host, a controller, and a monitor machine, respectively.
At the infected host, we create independent snapshot for each individual malware
instance to ensure no cross-infection between different malware. Our host-based
modules are also installed to collect data we need. At the monitor machine, we in-
stall a fake DNS server to redirect all the DNS queries. At the controller side, we
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install various malware controllers we could find to manipulate the infected machine.
We intend to reconstruct realistic attack scenarios that a botmaster sends commands
to his zombie army.
We have used 15 botnets for evaluation and they are summarized in Table 3.3.
Since we just have binary samples of most botnets except three (B1, B2, and B5),
we install and simply run them. Among them, 3 botnets (B1, B2, and B5) use IRC
protocol, 2 botnets (B4 and B10) use HTTP protocol, 2 botnets (B3 and B4) use P2P
protocols, and other 9 botnets use customized protocols. In addition, three botnets
(B3, B4, and B7) use encrypted protocols to evade network-level detection. In terms
of their actively spreading time in the wild (i.e. when they infect victims highly),
it varied from 2003 (B7) to recent (B4). Since these collected botnets can cover
diverse cases (e.g. from old one to currently working one, different types of protocols
including encryption, and various kinds of malware functionalities), we believe that
they can verify our system’s effectiveness and efficiency well.
3.5.2 Botnet Detection Results
We begin our evaluation with the test of the human-process-network correlation
analysis module and it is followed by the results of other modules.
3.5.2.1 Detection Results of Automatic Connections
First, we test whether a bot infected host really generates automatic connections
to remote servers and use the human-process-network correlation analysis module to
detect them. To test this, we installed each bot in a host and leave it without any
intervention. After a while, we find that all installed bots issue automatic connections
to remote servers to be controlled. All of the automatic connections are reported by
our human-process-network correlation analysis module and the detected information
is delivered to other modules - process reputation analysis module, system exposure
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ID Name Protocol Sample Functionalities
B1 PhatBot IRC Steal Key, Spam Mail Send, Network
Scan
B2 JarBot IRC Kill Process, Steal Key
B3 peacomm P2P ∗ Other
B4 Waledac HTTP, P2P ∗ Other
B5 PhaBot.α5 IRC Other
B6 Flux Custom Operate/Modify File, Kill Process,
Capture Desktop/Screen,
B7 nuclearRat Custom ∗ Download Update
B8 BiFrost Custom Operate File, Kill Process, Capture
Screen, Steal Key
B9 Cone Custom Operate file
B10 Http-Pentest HTTP Operate File, Kill Process, Capture
Screen
B11 Lizard Custom Capture Screen, DDoS
B12 PanBot Custom Flooding
B13 Penumbra Custom Operate File, Create Shell
B14 SeedTrojan Custom Download Update
B15 TBBot Custom Capture Screen, Create Shell
Table 3.3: Botnets for evaluation (Custom denotes a botnet uses its own protocol
and ∗ represents the protocol is encrypted).
analysis module, and network information trading analysis module.
3.5.2.2 Detection Results of the Process Reputation Model
The process reputation analysis module will receive domain names which a process
contacts. Then, the module analyzes the reputation of contacted domains. Since a
bot contacts multiple domains in a short time, we analyzed all contacting domains.
If the module finds any malicious domain from the contacted domains, it considers
the process malicious.
The detection results are shown in Table 3.4. As shown in the Table, the process
reputation analysis module detects 12 bots and misses 3 bots (B2, B3, and B4).
We investigate why our module missed them. In the case of B2 (peacomm) and
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ID Contacting
Domains
Detected Do-
mains
ID Contacting
Domains
Detected Do-
mains
B1 1 1 B9 2 2
B2 1 - B10 1 1
B3 2 - B11 1 1
B4 1 - B12 1 1
B5 6 2 B13 2 2
B6 3 2 B14 1 1
B7 2 1 B15 1 1
B8 3 2 -
Table 3.4: Detection results of automatic connections
B3 (Waledac), both bots only contacted the remote server using direct IP addresses
instead of domain names. Of course, we can also apply the IP addresses to our mod-
ule. However, unfortunately, their contacting targets are either private IP addresses
(192.168.X.X) or some hosts for which we could not get any useful information from
the third parties.
B4 (JarBot) contacts a regular IRC-server and the server has been operated for
several years and we could not find any malicious keyword from search results.
3.5.2.3 Detection Results of the System Resource Exposure Model
Receiving the information of an automatic connection trial from the human-
process-network correlation analysis module, the system exposure analysis module
began examining the target process.
When we tested the functionality of each malware listed in Table 3.3, we found
that the system exposure analysis module detects most of the malicious operations.
The detection results are summarized in Table 3.5.
It only misses 2 malicious operations of “B6 (Flux)”, the first operation is to
operate file which moves/creates a file in the host, and the second operation is to
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Function B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15
Operate
file
N S S,N S,N S,N
Modify
file
S
Kill pro-
cess
S,N S S S,N
Capture
Desktop
S,N
Capture
screen
N S,N S,N S,N S
DDoS S,N
Flooding S,N
Create
Shell
S,N S,N
Download
update
S S
Steal key S,N S,N S,N
Spam
Mail
Send
S,N
Network
Scan
S,N
Other
Opera-
tion
S,N S,N S
Table 3.5: Detection results of the System Resource Exposure and Network Infor-
mation Trading Module (shaded cells represent functionalities provided by malware.
Each “S” and “N” denotes each system resource exposure analysis and network in-
formation trading analysis module detect the functionalities, respectively).
capture screen which captures current screen.
When we analyze their resource exposure patterns, we find that their operations
are very similar to normal programs. In the case of operate file, malware just creates
a file under its permission and reports its success to remote server. In the capture
screen case, malware captures the current screen, saves its local folder, and delivers
captured screen information to a remote server. Both operations (in the point of host
view) are very similar to resource exposure patterns of normal applications - creates
a file and saves it in its local folder. However, we believe that these operations will be
detected by the network information trading analysis module, since they distribute
more information to the outside. We will show this result later.
65
3.5.2.4 Detection Results of the Network Information Model
After notifying an automatic connection, the network information trading anal-
ysis module captures network traffic between a process (not a host) that issued an
automatic connection and a remote server. If a process sends more packet/bytes
than receives packets/bytes, our module considers it anomalous.
As listed in Table 3.5, the network trading information analysis module detects
most malicious operations. It misses 7 malicious operations related to download
updates and file modification or operation. In the case of the download updates, an
infected host gains more data, so that our module can not detect an anomaly. In
addition, sometimes a bot-master server sends commands frequently to an infected
host, but does not require an answer. In this case, a bot also obtains more data.
In terms of the aggregated-view, our module detects all massive outgoing con-
nection trials, such as DDoS and flooding.
3.5.2.5 Corrleated Detection Results
If the process-reputation analysis, system exposure analysis and network infor-
mation trading analysis modules determine their decisions, these decision results are
delivered to the correlation engine. Based on delivered results, the correlation engine
makes a final decision for a process.
When we test malicious operations, the correlation engine can detect all malicious
operations and the results are shown in Table 3.6. As we discussed before, even
though a module misses an anomaly of an attack, other modules will complement it,
thus our combined results can detect all attacks.
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Functionality B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 B10 B11 B12 B13 B14 B15
Operate file C C C C C
Modify file C
Kill process C C C C
Capture Desktop C
Capture screen C C C C C
DDoS C
Flooding C
Create Shell C C
Download update C C
Steal key C C C
Spam Mail Send C
Network Scan C
Other Operation C C C
Table 3.6: Detection results of Correlation Engine (shaded cells represent functional-
ities provided by malware. ”C” denotes that correlation engine detects the attack).
3.5.3 False Positive Test Results of Benign Programs
In order to determine whether our modules misjudge benign processes as mali-
cious or not, we have tested 16 benign processes in SET-2, which is reserved for
false positive test in Section 3.4. They are general Windows applications programs
such as browsers, network management programs, office programs and multimedia
programs. Even if there are some programs, which produce automatic connections
frequently, in this test set, we add 8 more processes in the data set in order to validate
our modules more clearly. The added programs are browsers (Internet Exploere and
Chrome), p2p client (Emule) and multi-media application (Gom Player). Finally, we
have 24 processes.
When we tested 24 processes, 16 processes (8 from SET-2 and 8 from added
ones) produced automatic connections and all of these connections were detected by
the human-process-network correlation analysis module.
The 16 processes contacted 106 different domains automatically, and the domains
were examined by the process reputation analysis module, and our module decided
that all domains were benign so that it finally determined that the reputations of
processes are good.
67
In addition, the system exposure analysis module investigated these 16 processes
in detail, and decided that they were all benign. In detail, we found that some of
them touched Windows system folders (specifically, browsers and a network storage
program), however we could not observe any process that accesses critical registries
or creates a lot of network sockets.
In the case of the network information trading analysis module, it detects 6 pro-
cesses as anomalous and they are all browsers. Unfortunately, since we do not have
packet payloads (because of privacy issues), we can not understand why it happens
clearly. However, we presume that they send current status of web applications (in
the host) to remote servers.
Even though one of our modules considers some connection trials anomalous,
the correlation analyzer makes the right decision for all cases (i.e. all are benign).
Since the correlation analyzer combines classification information from three different
modules and makes a decision, even if one module makes a wrong decision, it can be
complemented by other modules.
3.5.4 Performance
We have measured the overhead of each module to verify the efficiency of the
proposed system. In this measurement, we want to show how our modules affect the
system and other applications.
To do this, we used two metrics in measuring the overhead; memory usage and
program delay. The memory usage presents how our modules consume the resources
of memory and the program delay represents how our modules make other programs
slow when our modules are running. To measure the program delay, we selected
three types of test programs, Internet Explorer which produces network connections
frequently, Calculator which mainly uses CPU, and Notepad which produces some
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disk operations. We compared the running time of these programs between when
our modules are running and not‡. In the case of the Internet Explorer, we simply
visit one web site and close. We just divide some numbers using Calculator and read
a file and save it to other file using Notepad.
We will start performance measurements for the human-process-network correla-
tion analysis and system exposure analysis modules, since they are installed into a
host and affect the performance of the host directly.
Overhead of Human-Process-Network Correlation Analysis Module:
At first, we have measured the overhead of the human-process-network correlation
analysis module. As shown in Table 3.7, the overhead of this module is 1.35% at
maximum and even 0% (i.e. our module does not affect some programs at all). In
addition, this module only consumes 1.81 MB of memory. Thus, we believe that the
overhead of this module is nearly ignorable.
Item w/o module with module overhead (%)
Internet Explorer 177 (ms) 179.4 (ms) 1.35%
Notepad 4,206 (ms) 4,218 (ms) 0.29%
Calculator 26 (ms) 26 (ms) 0%
Table 3.7: Overhead of human-process-network correlation analysis module.
Overhead of System Exposure Analysis Module: In addition, we have
measured the overhead of the system exposure analysis module. This module will
show relatively high overhead. Since it has to monitor a lot of system calls which are
frequently called by a process, it is very hard to reduce the overhead of this module.
‡When we performed this test, we run a test program 5 times and found the average value
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When we measure the overhead, we observe that it consumes 9.18 MB of memory
and produces overhead around 6% at maximum and 1 % at minimum, as presented
in Table 3.8.
The overhead seems to be not so high and even very low in a case. In addition, our
module does not need to monitor processes all the time. The system exposure analysis
module only investigates a process when the process issues automatic connections to
untrustable remote sites. As we discussed in Section 3.4, the automatic connections
to untrustable sites happen very rarely, at most 8 - 9 connections/hour in our dataset.
Hence, we also consider that the overhead from this module is low.
Item w/o module with module overhead (%)
Internet Explorer 177 (ms) 185.1 (ms) 4.51%
Notepad 4,206 (ms) 4,463 (ms) 6.12%
Calculator 26 (ms) 26.3 (ms) 1.15%
Table 3.8: Overhead of system exposure analysis module.
Overhead of Other Modules: Unlike human-process-network correlation and
system exposure modules, the other modules of the process reputation analysis mod-
ule, the network information trading analysis module, and the correlation analyzer
exists in the other host(s) and they mainly observe network traffic or third party
information. Thus they do not affect the performance of the host directly.
3.5.5 Summary of Evaluation Results
We will summarize the evaluation results of our system by showing how our
system is effective and efficient. In terms of the effectiveness, we evaluate that our
system detects all malicious operations from the various kinds of botnets without any
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false positive. Even if botnets employ encrypted messages for their C& C channels
to evade detection, our system can detect them with the help of combined results
from each module. In terms of the efficiency, we evaluate that our system does not
put high overhead on the hosts. Thus, we believe that our system can be used as a
real-time monitoring/detecting system.
3.6 Related Work
There are several approaches to detect bots at the network level. Karasaridis et
al., proposed an approach of detecting bots based on network traffic pattern analysis
[49]. In [108], the authors proposed a system detecting malware (also bots) through
aggregating network flows. Gu et al., proposed several promising approaches which
detect bots through network behavior correlated analysis [34, 32, 35]. Our work is
different from the above work, since we design several new network level sensors and
we consider host level features as well. The host-network cooperation allows us to
detect malware more effectively.
Detecting bots in the host level is also popular due to its effectiveness. In [11, 92],
the authors tainted all memories and resources touched by a process to determine
whether it was malicious or not. In [53], Kolbitsch et al., provided an way of detect-
ing malware through examining the system call sequences/graphs. Although they
detected malware accurately, they could cause high overhead in the host. Our work
designs several new host level sensors without analyzing all running processes all the
time, only investigating the process when necessity.
In [57], Lanzi et al., provided an approach of detecting malware at the host by
investigating the access patterns of the process. Our work differs from [57], since
we use different features in host level (e.g., network socket creation) and detection
models. Moreover, our work analyzes the binary only when necessary, and it can
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significantly reduce the overhead.
There is also an approach to detect bots combining information obtained from
both of the host and network level [110]. This work uses network sensors to trigger
host analysis, thus it suffers from the same limitations of network-based detection
approaches. If a bot can evade the network level monitoring, it evades their detection
system. Our work differs from their work in that we use different features/models
and our coordination is triggered from host level features.
In [97], Trestian et al., uses the Google search engine to comprehend the network
traffic, and our approach of identifying reputation of a process also employs search
engines. Our work differs in its main goal (for security) and detection models. Also,
while they only use IP address for their query, we use the process and domain name
as well.
3.7 Limitations
Like many detection systems, our system is not perfect. In current implementa-
tion, we do not consider the protection of our host modules yet. In addition, some
kernel malware like rootkit could fool our host modules such as faking human-driven
events as OS level. This problem can be solved by employing hardware/TPM [37]
or hypervisor-based introspection techniques [28, 45], which is our future work.
Our reputation module mainly assumes that bots will use DNS to contact their
master. However not all bots may use DNS, some bots use IP address directly. Our
reputation model is easily to be extended to handle IP address as well.
3.8 Summary of this Chapter
It is a very challenging problem to detect bots effectively and efficiently. In this
work, we studied various kinds of features in the network and the host level and
chose promising features that enable to detect bots effectively. Then, we proposed
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a novel detection approach with correlative and coordinated analysis of each feature
to detect bots efficiently. In our evaluation on real world data, we show that our
features are feasible to detect bots effectively, and verify our system can detect bots
accurately without any false positive.
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4. SECURING FUTURE NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present how we design a future network architecture with
security. It is not easy to redesign a whole network architecture at initial stage, but
we can provide a new framework for security on a possible network technology that
is considered as a future network. This chapter suggests a possible solution that we
can make a future network secure, and it contains several possible example cases for
security applications.
To design a new secure network architecture, we employ the technology of Soft-
ware Defined Networking (SDN). SDN enabled networks distinguish themselves from
legacy network infrastructures by dramatically rethinking the relationship between
the data and control planes of the network device. SDN embraces the paradigm
of highly programmable switch infrastructures [62], enabling software to compute
an optimal flow routing decision on demand. For modern networks, which must
increasingly deal with host virtualization and dynamic application migration, SDN
may offer the agility needed to handle dynamic network orchestration beyond that
which traditional networks can achieve.
For an SDN enabled switch, the data plane is made programmable, where flows
are dynamically specified within a flow table. The flow table contains a set of flow
rules, which specify how the data plane should process all active network flows. In
short, the control plane provides the basic instructions that govern how to forward,
modify, or drop each packet that traverses the SDN enabled switch. The switch’s
control plane is simplified to support a protocol (e.g., OpenFlow protocol), which
allows the switch to communicate statistics and new flow requests to an external
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control plane (e.g., controller in OpenFlow). In return, it receives flow rules that
extend its flow table ruleset.
The control plane is situated above a set of SDN enabled switches, often on
lower-cost commodity hardware. It is the coordination point for the network’s flow
rule production logic, providing necessary flow rule updates to the switch, either in
response to new flow requests or to reprogram the switch when conditions change. As
a controller may communicate with multiple SDN enabled switches simultaneously,
it can distribute a set of coordinated flow rules across the switches to direct routing
or optimize tunneling in a way that may dramatically improve the efficiency of traffic
flows. The controller also provides an API to enable one to develop SDN applications,
which implement the logic needed to formulate new flow rules. It is this application
layer that is our central focus.
From a network security perspective, SDN technology offers researchers with an
unprecedented singular point of control over the network flow routing decisions across
the data planes of all OF-enabled network components. Using SDN technology, an
SDN security app can implement much more complex logic than simplifying halting
or forwarding a flow. Such applications can incorporate stateful flow rule production
logic to implement complex quarantine procedures, or malicious connection migration
functions that can redirect malicious network flows in ways not easily perceived by the
flow participants. Flow-based security detection algorithms can also be redesigned
as SDN security apps, but implemented much more concisely and deployed more
efficiently, as we illustrate in examples within this chapter.
We introduce a new security application development framework called FRESCO.
FRESCO is intended to address several key issues that can accelerate the composition
of new SDN enabled security services. FRESCO exports a scripting API that en-
ables security practitioners to code security monitoring and threat detection logic as
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modular libraries. These modular libraries represent the elementary processing units
in FRESCO, and may be shared and linked together to provide complex network
defense applications.
FRESCO currently includes a library of 16 commonly reusable modules, which
we intend to expand over time. Ideally, more sophisticated security modules can
be built by connecting basic FRESCO modules. Each FRESCO module includes
five interfaces: (i) input, (ii) output, (iii) event, (iv) parameter, and (v) action.
By simply assigning values to each interface and connecting necessary modules, a
FRESCO developer can replicate a range of essential security functions, such as
firewalls, scan detectors, attack deflectors, or IDS detection logic.
FRESCO modules can also produce flow rules, and thus provide an efficient means
to implement security directives to counter threats that may be reported by other
FRESCO detection modules. Our FRESCO modules incorporate several security
functions ranging from simple address blocking to complex flow redirection proce-
dures (dynamic quarantine, or reflecting remote scanners into a honeynet, and so on).
FRESCO also incorporates an API that allows existing DPI-based legacy security
tools (e.g., BotHunter [34]) to invoke FRESCO’s countermeasure modules. Through
this API, we can construct an efficient countermeasure application, which monitors
security alerts from a range of legacy IDS and anti-malware applications and trig-
gers the appropriate FRESCO response module to reprogram the data planes of all
switches in the OpenFlow network.
Contributions. In summary, our primary contribution is the introduction of
FRESCO, which simplifies the development and deployment of complex security
services for SDN networks. To this end, we describe
• FRESCO: a new application development framework to assist researchers in
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prototyping new composable security services in SDN enabled networks. FRESCO
scripts can be defined in a manner agnostic to SDN control plane implementa-
tion or switch hardware (an important feature given the rapid evolution of the
protocol standard).
• A collection of SDN security mitigation directives (FRESCO modules) and
APIs to enable legacy applications to trigger these modules. Using FRESCO,
security projects could integrate alarms from legacy network security DPI-
based applications as inputs to FRESCO detection scripts or as triggers that
invoke FRESCO response scripts that generate new flow rules.
• Several exemplar security applications demonstrate both threat detection and
mitigation in a SDN network, including scan detectors [48, 82, 47] and Bot-
Miner [33]. We further show that existing security applications can be easily
created with the use of FRESCO. For example, our FRESCO implementations
demonstrate over 90% reduction in lines of code when compared to standard
implementations and recently published another SDN implementations [63].
• A performance evaluation of FRESCO, which shows promise in developing
SDN security services that introduce minimal overhead for use in live network
environments.
4.2 Term Definition
Note that in this chapter, we use OpenFlow [62] network environment for our SDN
testbed, and we use the terms of both OpenFlow and SDN when we talk about SDN
technology. OpenFlow is the most common technology for SDN, and many projects
and products in both of academia and industry are implemented with OpenFlow.
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Thus, we believe that it is acceptable to use OpenFlow in developing our framework
for SDN.
In addition, we use the term of controller to denote the control plane and the term
of OpenFlow/SDN enabled switch for the data plane supporting SDN technology.
The term of controller is commonly used in OpenFlow specification, and it is widely
used term. The term of application is used to denote a network application running
on the control plane, and it denotes a software program that tries to control network
flows with the help of SDN technology. Sometimes, we use OF instead of OpenFlow,
and it is the short form of OpenFlow.
4.3 Motivation
Our intent is to design an application framework that enables the modular design
of complex SDN enabled network security services, which can be built from smaller
sharable libraries of security functions. Before presenting FRESCO’s design, we first
review some of the challenges that motivate the features of our framework.
4.3.1 The Policy Enforcement Challenge
The first challenge, which we call the policy enforcement challenge, stems from
the fact that SDN provides no inherent mechanisms to reconcile rule conflicts as
competing SDN applications assert new rules into a switch. For example, a set
of rules designed to quarantine an internal compute server might subsequently be
overridden by a load balancing application that may determine that the quarantined
host is now the least loaded server. One needs a mechanism to ensure that flow rules
produced by a security application will take precedence over those produced from
non-security aware applications. SDN also incorporate a packet alteration functions
(i.e., the set action), specifiable within its flow rule format. This feature enables
virtual tunnels between hosts, such that a virtual tunnel can be used to circumvent a
78
flow rule that was inserted to prevent two hosts from establishing a connection [74].
To address this challenge, we have designed and implemented a security enforce-
ment kernel (SEK), which is integrated directly into the control plane upon which
FRESCO operates. In [74], we present the design of our SEK, along with a prototype
implementation called FortNOX, which we integrated into the open-source NOX [36]
controller. FortNOX offers several important features upon which FRESCO relies to
ensure that flow rules derived from security service are prioritized and enforced over
competing flow rules produced by non-security-critical applications:
• Rule source identification: the SEK introduces a trust model that allows
FRESCO applications to digitally sign each candidate flow rule, thus enabling
the SEK to determine if a candidate flow rule was produced by a FRESCO
security module, an SDN application, or by a network administrator.
• Rule conflict detection: To detect conflicts between a candidate rule set and
the set of rules currently active in the switch. The SEK incorporate an inline
rule conflict analysis algorithm called alias set rule reduction, which detects
flow rule conflicts, including those that arise through set actions that are used
to produce virtual tunnels.
• Conflict resolution: When a conflict arises, the SEK applies a hierarchical
authority model that enables a candidate rule to override (replace) an existing
flow rule when the digital signature of the rule source is deemed to possess
more authority than the source whose rule is in conflict.
4.3.2 The Information Deficiency Challenge
The control planes in SDN do not uniformly capture and store TCP session
information, among other key state tracking data, which is often required to de-
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velop security functionality (e.g., TCP connection status, IP reputation). We call
this an information deficiency challenge. The FRESCO architecture incorporates
a database module (FRESCO-DB) that simplifies storage and management of ses-
sion state shared across applications. FRESCO also exports a high-level API in the
FRESCO language that abstracts away complexities relating to switch management
and specific controller implementations. This abstraction is a critical feature to en-
able module sharing across SDN network instances that may vary in the control
plane
Figure 4.1: High-level overview of the FRESCO architecture.
4.3.3 The Security Service Composition Challenge
The FRESCO framework incorporates a modular and composable design archi-
tecture, inspired by the Click router architecture [52], which fosters rapid and col-
laborative development of applications through module composition. For example,
a security module design to recognize certain traffic patterns that may represent
a threat should be easily linkable to a variety of potential threat mitigation mod-
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ules that, when triggered by the detection module, produce appropriate flow rule
responses. FRESCO incorporates a scripting language that enables the linking of
modules through data sharing and event triggering. Another important challenge is
the need to provide an API that can facilitate flow rule production decisions using
information produced from legacy DPI-based security applications (such as IDS or
anti-malware applications).
4.3.4 The Threat Response Translation Challenge
The SDN technology enables the controlling software layer to communicate flow
handling instructions to the data plane. However, while network security technolo-
gies do indeed produce threat alerts applicable to responses for individual flows,
these technologies also have a need to express more complex (even stateful) security
response directives that may span many flow rules, or even address network-wide
attack scenarios. We call this the threat response translation challenge.
For example, one may wish to define a notion of host quarantine, in which all flows
from an infected internal machine are blocked, with the exception that the machine’s
web traffic should be redirected to a web server that returns quarantine notification
pages to the machine’s user. One might also wish to define redirection directives
that will silently redirect flows from a detected hostile external entity away from
an internal production network and into a honeynet for analysis. One might even
want to produce a network-wide response to shun malicious traffic, or alternatively,
incorporate high-priority flow rules to ensure that emergency administrative flows
succeed during a DOS attack.
Such security directives may require a complex set of flow rule production logic,
which is also ideally sharable as a countermeasure library that could be coupled with
many different detection algorithms.
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4.4 FRESCO Design
The FRESCO framework consists of an application layer (which provides an
interpreter and APIs to support composable application development) and a security
enforcement kernel (SEK, which enforces the policy actions from developed security
applications), as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Both components are integrated into NOX,
an open-source OpenFlow controller.
FRESCO’s application layer is implemented using NOX python modules, which
are extended through FRESCO’s APIs to provide two key developer functions:
(i) a FRESCO Development Environment [DE], and (ii) a Resource Controller
[RC], which provides FRESCO application developers with OpenFlow switch- and
controller-agnostic access to network flow events and statistics.
Developers use the FRESCO script language to instantiate and define the inter-
actions between the NOX python security modules (we present FRESCO’s scripting
language in Section 4.5.3). These scripts invoke FRESCO-internal modules, which
are instantiated to form a security application that is driven by the input specified
via the FRESCO scripts (e.g., TCP session and network state information) and ac-
cessed via FRESCO’s DE database API. These instantiated modules are triggered
(executed) by FRESCO DE as the triggering input events are received. FRESCO
modules may also produce new flow rules, such as in response to a perceived secu-
rity threat, which are then processed by the controller’s security enforcement kernel
[SEK] (Section 4.6).
4.5 FRESCO Application Layer
The basic operating unit in the FRESCO framework is called a module. A mod-
ule is the most important element of FRESCO. All security functions running on
FRESCO are realized through an assemblage of modules. Modules are defined as
82
Python objects that include five interface types: (i) input, (ii) output, (iii) parame-
ter, (iv) action, and (v) event. As their names imply, input and output represent the
interfaces that receive and transmit values for the module. A parameter is used to
define the module’s configuration or initialization values. A module can also define
an action to implement a specific operation on network packets or flows. An event
is used to notify a module when it is time to perform an action.
A module is implemented as an event-driven processing function. A security
function can be realized by a single module or may be composed into a directed
graph of processing to implement more complex security services. For example, if a
user desires to build a naive port comparator application whose function is to drop
all HTTP packets, this function can be realized by combining two modules. The first
module has input, output, parameter, and event. The input of the first module is the
destination port value of a packet, its parameter is the integer value 80, an event is
triggered whenever a new flow arrives, and output is the result of comparing the input
destination port value and parameter value 80. We pass the output results of the first
module as input of the second module and we assign drop and forward actions to the
second module. In addition, the second module performs its function whenever it is
pushed as an input. Hence, the event of this module is set to be push. A module
diagram and modules representing this example scenario are shown in Figure 4.2.
An action is an operation to handle network packets (or flows). The actions
provided by FRESCO derive from the actions supported by the NOX OpenFlow
controller. The OpenFlow standard specifies three required actions, which should
be supported by all OpenFlow network switches, and four optional actions, which
might be supported by OpenFlow network switches [69]. OpenFlow requires support
for three basic actions: (i) drop, which drops a packet, (ii) output, which forwards a
packet to a defined port (in this work, we sometimes use the term forward to denote
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of FRESCO module design (left: model diagram; right: naive
port comparator application)
the output action), and (iii) group, which processes a packet through the specified
group. As these actions must be supported by all OpenFlow network switches,
FRESCO also exports them to higher-level applications.
One optional action of interest is the set action, which enables the switch to
rewrite a matching packet’s header fields (e.g., the source IP, destination port) to
enable such features as flow path redirection. Because one of the primary goals of
FRESCO is to simplify development of security functions, FRESCO handles possible
issues related to the set action by breaking the set action into three more specific
actions: redirect, mirror, and quarantine. Through the redirect action, an appli-
cation can redirect network packets to a host without explicitly maintaining state
and dealing with address translation. FRESCO offloads session management tasks
from applications and automatically changes the source and destination IP address
to handle redirects. The mirror action copies an incoming packet and forwards it to
a mirror port for further analysis. The functionality may be used to send a packet
to a feature or other packet analysis systems. The quarantine action isolates a flow
from the network. Quarantine does not mean dropping a particular flow, but rather,
FRESCO attaches a tag to each packet to denote a suspicious (or malicious) packet.
If a packet has the tag, then this packet can traverse only to allowed hosts (viz., a
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FRESCO script can fishbowl an infected host into an isolated network using packet
tags).
4.5.1 FRESCO Development Environment
The FRESCO development environment (DE) provides security researchers with
useful information and tools to synthesize security controls. To realize this goal,
we design the FRESCO DE with two considerations. First, this environment must
export an API that allows the developer to detect threats and assert flow constraints
while abstracting the NOX implementation and OF protocol complexities. Second,
the component must relieve applications from the need to perform redundant data
collection and management tasks that are common across network security appli-
cations. The FRESCO development environment provides four main functions: (i)
script-to-module translation, (ii) database management, (iii) event management,
and (iv) instance execution.
Script translation: This function automatically translates FRESCO scripts
to modules, and creates instances from modules, thus abstracting the implementa-
tion complexities of producing OF controller extensions. It is also responsible for
validating the registration of modules. Registration is performed via a registration
API, which enables an authorized administrator to generate a FRESCO application
ID and an encryption key pair. The developer embeds the registered application
ID into the FRESCO script, and then encrypts the script with the supplied private
key. The naming convention of FRESCO applications incorporates the application
ID, which is then used by FRESCO to associate the appropriate public key with
the application. In addition to registering modules, the module manager coordinates
how modules are connected to each other and delivers input and event values to each
module.
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Database management: The DB manager collects various kinds of network
and switch state information, and provides an interface for an instance to use the
information. It provides its own storage mechanism that we call the FRESCO-
DataBase (F-DB), which enables one to share state information across modules. For
example, if an instance wants to monitor the number of transferred packets by an
OpenFlow enabled switch, it can simply request the F-DB for this information. In
addition, this database can be used to temporarily store an instance.
Event management: The event manager notifies an instance about the oc-
currence of predefined events. It checks whether the registered events are triggered,
and if so delivers these events to an instance. FRESCO supports many different
kinds of events, including flow arrivals, denied connections, and session resets. In
addition, the event manager exposes an API that enables event reporting from legacy
DPI-based security applications, such as Snort [89] or BotHunter [34]. The security
community has developed a rich set of network-based threat monitoring services, and
the event manager’s API enables one to tigger instances that incorporate flow rule
response logic. ∗
Instance execution: This function loads the created instances into memory
to be run over the FRESCO framework. During load time, FRESCO decrypts the
application using the associated public key, and confirms that the ID embedded in
the script corresponds to the appropriate public key. The application then operates
with the authority granted to this application ID at registration time.
4.5.2 FRESCO Resource Controller
The FRESCO resource controller monitors OpenFlow network switches and keeps
track of their status. A flow rule that is distributed from a FRESCO application is
∗The example case for this scenario is shown in section 4.7.
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inserted into a flow table in an OpenFlow switch. Because the flow table has a limit
on the number of entries it can hold, it is possible that a flow rule from a FRESCO
application cannot be inserted into the flow table. However, because flow rules from
a FRESCO application deal with security policy enforcement, such flow rules require
immediate installation into the flow table of an OpenFlow network switch. Thus,
FRESCO may forcibly evict some old or stale flow rules, both FRESCO and non-
FRESCO, from the switch flow table to make space for new flow rules. This operation
is done by the resource controller. Garbage collecting inactive FRESCO rules does
not compromise the network security policy: if a prohibited flow is re-attempted
later, the FRESCO SEK will prevent other OF applications from performing the
flow setup.
Variable Explanation Possible Values
instance name (#input)(#output) denotes an instance name
(should be unique)
(#input) and (#output) denote the
number of inputs and outputs
type: [module] denotes a module for this in-
stance
[module] names an existing module
input: a1,a2,... denotes input items for a mod-
ule
an may be set of flows, packets or inte-
ger values
output: b1, b2,... denotes output items for a
module
bn may be set of flows, packets or inte-
ger values
parameter: c1,c2,... denotes configuration values of
a module
cn may be real numbers or strings
event: d1,d2,... denotes events delivered to a
module
dn may be any predefined string
action : condition ? action,... denotes set of conditions and
actions performed in the mod-
ule
condition follows the same syntax of
if condition of python language; ac-
tion may be one of the following
strings (DROP, FORWARD, REDI-
RECT, MIRROR, QUARANTINE)
{ } denotes the module start ({)
and end (})
-
Table 4.1: Key variables in the FRESCO scripting language
The resource controller performs two main functions. The first function, which
we call the switch monitor, periodically collects switch status information, such as
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port_comparator (1)(1) {
type:Comparator
event:INCOMING_FLOW
input:destination_port
output:comparison_result
parameter:80
/* no actions are defined */
action: -
}
do_action (1)(0) {
type:ActionHandler
event:PUSH
input:comparison_result
output: - /* no outputs are defined */
parameter: - /* no parameters are defined */
/* if input equals to 1, drop, otherwise, forward */
action:comparator_result == 1 ? DROP : FORWARD
}
Figure 4.3: FRESCO script with two connecting modules used to build the naive
port comparator
the number of empty flow entries, and stores the collected information in the switch
status table. The second component, i.e., the garbage collection, checks the switch
status table to monitor whether the flow table in an OpenFlow switch is nearing
capacity. If the availability of a flow table becomes lower than a threshold value (θ),
the garbage collector identifies and evicts the least active flow, using least frequently
used (LFU) as FRESCO’s default policy.
4.5.3 FRESCO Script Language
To simplify development of security applications, FRESCO provides its own script
language to assist developers in composing security functions from elementary mod-
ules. The textual language, modeled after the Click language [52], requires the
definition of six different variables per instance of modular element: (i) type, (ii)
input, (iii) output, (iv) parameter, (v) action, and (vi) event.
To configure modules through a FRESCO script, developers must first create an
instance of a module, and this instance information is defined in type variable. For
example, to use a function that performs a specific action, a developer can create
an instance of the ActionHandler module (denoted as type:ActionHandler within a
FRESCO script).
Developers can specify a script’s input and output, and register events for it
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to process by defining the script’s input, output, parameter, and event variables.
Multiple value sets for these variables (e.g., specifying two data inputs to input)
may be defined by using a comma as the field separator.
Defining an instance is very similar to defining a function in C or C++. A module
starts with the module name, two variables for representing the number of inputs
and outputs, and left braces (i.e., { ). The numbers of inputs and outputs are used
to sanity check the script during module translation. Like C or C++ functions, a
module definition ends with a right brace (i.e., } ).
The action variable represents actions that a module will perform based on some
conditions, where the conditions are determined by one of the input items. There
may be multiple conditions in the action, which are separated by semicolons. We
summarize these variables in Table 4.1, and Figure 4.3 shows example scripts of
the port comparator application shown in Figure 4.2 (right) with two connecting
modules.
FRESCO Script Execution: We use a simple running example, shown in
Figures 4.3 and 4.4, to illustrate the execution of a FRESCO script. First, an ad-
ministrator composes a FRESCO script (shown in Figure 4.3) (1), and loads it into
FRESCO (2). Next, when Host A sends a packet to port 80 of Host B through
an OpenFlow switch, as illustrated in Figure 4.4 (3), this packet delivery event is
reported to the FRESCO DE (4). The FRESCO DE creates instances from modules
defined in the FRESCO script (i.e., port comparator instance from comparator mod-
ule and do action instance from ActionHandler module) and dynamically loads them.
The FRESCO DE runs each instance (5, 6), and when it receives an action from the
do action module (i.e., drop) (7), it translates this action into flow rules, which can
be understood by an OpenFlow switch. Finally, these flow rules are installed into
the switch through the FRESCO SEK (8).
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Figure 4.4: Operational illustration of running FRESCO script (case of the FRESCO
script shown in Figure 4.3)
4.6 FRESCO Security Enforcement Kernel
Security applications developed in FRESCO scripts can enforce diverse security
policies, such as DROP, REDIRECT, QUARANTINE, to react to network threats
by simply setting an action variable, as listed in Table 4.1. These high-level secu-
rity policies can help developers focus on implementing security applications, and
these policies will be automatically translated into flow rules for OpenFlow enabled
switches by FRESCO DE (e.g., the REDIRECT action will be translated into three
flow rules). Thus, developers do not need to care about network-level flow rules.
However, when FRESCO DE enforces translated flow rules to switches, it will
face a new challenge, which stems from the fact that OpenFlow provides no inherent
mechanisms to reconcile rule conflicts as competing OpenFlow applications assert
new rules into a switch. For example, a set of rules designed to quarantine an inter-
nal computing server (i.e., the QUARANTINE action in a FRESCO script) might
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subsequently be overridden by a load-balancing application that may determine that
the quarantined host is now the least-loaded server. One needs a mechanism to
ensure that flow rules produced by a security application will take precedence over
those produced from non-security-aware applications. OpenFlow also incorporates a
packet alteration functions (i.e., the set action), specifiable within its flow rule for-
mat. This feature enables virtual tunnels between hosts, such that a virtual tunnel
can be used to circumvent a flow rule that was inserted to prevent two hosts from
establishing a connection.
To address this issue, FRESCO incorporates a security enforcement kernel (SEK),
which is integrated directly into the OpenFlow controller upon which FRESCO op-
erates. A more complete discussion of FRESCO SEK is provided in a published
workshop paper [74]. FRESCO SEK offers several important features upon which
FRESCO relies to ensure that flow rules derived from security services are prioritized
and enforced over competing flow rules produced by non-security-critical applica-
tions:
• Rule source identification: The SEK introduces a trust model that allows
FRESCO applications to digitally sign each candidate flow rule, thus enabling
the SEK to determine if a candidate flow rule was produced by a FRESCO
security module, by an OpenFlow application, or by a network administrator.
• Rule conflict detection: To detect conflicts between a candidate rule set and
the set of rules currently active in the switch, the SEK incorporates an inline
rule conflict analysis algorithm called alias set rule reduction, which detects
flow rule conflicts, including those that arise through set actions that are used
to produce virtual tunnels. Since this is not the main focus of this chapter,
we include a relatively more detailed description of our rule conflict detection
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algorithm in the following subsections.
• Conflict resolution: When a conflict arises, the SEK applies a hierarchical
authority model that enables a candidate rule to override (replace) an existing
flow rule when the digital signature of the rule source is deemed to possess
more authority than the source whose rule is in conflict.
4.6.1 FRESCO Security Enforcement Kernel Implementation
It is possible that the flow rules created by non-security-related SDN applications
conflict with the flow constraints distributed by FRESCO applications. A conflict
arises when one or more flow rules would allow a flow from one end point to another
that is specifically prohibited by a flow constraint rule produced by a FRESCO
application. To manage FRESCO flow constraints and perform conflict evaluation,
we introduce the FRESCO SEK as an embedded NOX extension. Since we use NOX
for our SEK implementation, we use OpenFlow protocol and OpenFlow applications
for testing its implementation.
Two main components of OpenFlow rules are match conditions and actions. The
former specifies packet header fields that must match for the rule’s associated actions
to trigger. The FRESCO SEK maintains the set of active constraint rules produced
by registered FRESCO modules. Constraint rules inserted into the FRESCO SEK
security constraints table are considered active, and must be explicitly deactivated by
a registered FRESCO module. Because non-FRESCO applications can publish flow
rules that potentially violate FRESCO’s network security policy, The FRESCO SEK
employs two protection mechanisms to prevent such violations. The first mechanism
is rule prioritization, in which flow rules produced by FRESCO applications are pub-
lished to the switch using the highest rule priority. This immediately overrides any
active flow rules in the switch’s flow table that may contradict FRESCO’s security
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policy. Second, the FRESCO SEK applies a conflict detection algorithm between
each new flow rule and the security constraints table, rejecting the new flow rule if
a conflict is detected. Conflict detection is performed in two passes: alias set rule
reduction, and then rule set conflict evaluation.
A conflict can also happen between security constraints enforced by different
FRESCO applications. In this case, the FRESCO SEK can still detect conflicts but
it needs to determine which constraint should be enforced. By default, FRESCO
SEK keeps the first enforced constraint (i.e., ignore following conflicted constraint),
but it is easy to be configured by the administrators to apply other approaches (e.g.,
keep the last enforced constraint, or based on some priority settings).
4.6.1.1 Alias Set Rule Reduction
To detect conflicts between a candidate rule set and FRESCO’s constraint rule
sets, the source and destination IP addresses, their ports, and wild card members † for
each rule in a rule set are used to derive rules with alias sets representing IP addresses
and ports. The initial alias sets contain the first rule’s IP addresses, network masks,
and ports (where 0 [zero] represents any port). If the rule’s action causes a field
substitution via a set action, the resultant value is added to the appropriate alias set.
These sets are then compared to the next rule’s alias sets. If there is an intersection
between both the source and address sets, the union of the respective sets is used as
the subsequent rule’s alias sets. For example, given the FRESCO rule,
a→ b drop packet (4.1)
its source alias set is (a), while its destination alias set is (b). The derived rule is
†For OpenFlow 1.1, the examined members include the source and destination network mask
fields (for OpenFlow 1.0 these are implicitly defined by the wildcard field).
93
(a)→ (b) drop packet (4.2)
For the candidate (evasion) rule set,
1 a→ c set (a⇒ a’)
2 a’→ c set (c⇒ b)
3 a’→ b forward packet
(4.3)
the intermediate alias sets are
1 a→ c set (a⇒ a’) (a, a’) (c)
2 a’→ c set (c⇒ b) (a, a’) (c, b)
3 a’→ b forward packet (a, a’) (c, b) forward packet
(4.4)
and the derived rule is
(a, a’)⇒ (c, b) forward packet (4.5)
4.6.1.2 Rule Set Conflict Evaluation
The FRESCO SEK first performs alias set rule reduction on the candidate rule set.
These validity checks are then performed between each derived FRESCO constraint
rule cRule and each derived flow rule fRule, as follows:
1. Skip any cRule/fRule pair with mismatched prototypes.
2. Skip any cRule/fRule pair whose actions are both either forward or drop packet.
3. If cRule’s alias sets intersect those of fRule’s, declare a conflict.
Thus, given the example security constraint table in Equation 4.2 and the can-
didate rule set in Equation 4.5, assuming that both rules are TCP protocol, the
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first candidate rule passes the first two checks. However, for the third check, be-
cause the intersection of the source and destination alias sets results in (a) and (b),
respectively, the candidate rule is declared to be in conflict.
As a practical consideration, because OpenFlow rules permit both wildcard field
matches and IP address network masks, determining alias set intersection involves
more than simple membership equality checks. To accommodate this, we define
comparison operators that determine if a field specification is (i) more encompassing
(“wider”), (ii) more specific (“narrower”), (iii) equal, or (iv) unequal. Thus, an
intersection occurs when the pairwise comparisons between all fields of a candidate
rule are wider than, equal to, or narrower than that of the corresponding fields of
the constraint table rule.
For a formalization of the above, we first define some terms: (i) Si is the ith entry
of security constraints, (ii) Fi is the ith entry of flow rules, (iii) SCi,j is the jth item
of the ith entry of the condition part of the security constraint, (iv) SAi is the ith
entry of the action part of the security constraint, (v) FCi,j is the jth item of the
ith condition part of a flow rule from non-FRESCO applications, and (vi) FAi is the
ith action part of the flow rule. At this time, both SCi,j and FCi,j are sets whose
elements are one of the specific value or some ranges and j ∈ {1, 2, ..., 14}. Rule
contradiction is then formalized using the following notation:
if there is any Si, satisfying SCi,j ∩ FCi,j 6=  and
SAi 6= FAi, for all j, thenFi is conflicted with Si
(4.6)
Finally, upon an update to the security constraints table, rule set conflict res-
olution is performed against all flow rules currently active within the switch. If a
conflict is detected in which the switch rule is found to be wider than the FRESCO
rule, SEK initiates a request to the switch to flush the resident rule.
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4.6.2 Extending FRESCO Security Enforcement Kernel with Formal Method
We propose a provably correct and automatic method for verifying that a given
non-bypass property holds with respect to a set of flow rules committed by an Open-
Flow controller. Non-bypassability is a basic security property, which is enforced by
most firewalls and switches. This property stipulates that packets or flows satisfying
specified conditions must adhere to a predefined action, such as forward or drop.
Since flow tables of switches in OpenFlow environments can include a large number
of prioritized flow entries, manual verification of the non-bypass property on large
flow tables across switches is challenging. Furthermore, given the dynamic nature
of flow tables, the heterogeneity of vendor implementation in flow table ordering
and management, and complex flow rule constructs such as set operations that can
alter packet content, even automated security evaluation systems are challenged by
OpenFlow. Here, we address this challenge of verifying the compliance of a flow rule
set against an invariant security policy. We call this kernel FRESCO SEK-FM.
4.6.2.1 Non-Bypass Security Property Violations
FRESCO SEK-FM addresses the problem of verifying that the current state of
flow rules inserted in a switch’s flow table(s) remain consistent with the current
network security policy. We decompose the network security policy into a set of
assertions, which we refer to as Non-bypass properties. Intuitively, a Non-bypass
property is commonly observable in modern networks as the flow deny and allow
rule, which are statically defined to restrict or enable flows throughout and across
the network. A Non-bypass property specifies whether a certain packet/flow matching
a set of conditions should be dropped or forwarded to its destination (we formalize
this notion in Section 4.6.2.3).
For the purpose of verifying a non-bypass property across an OF-network, it is
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Condition
Flow Field 1 Field 2 Field 3 Field 4 Action
Table Src IP Src Port Dst IP Dst port Set
1 5 [0,19] 6 [0,19] { (drop) }
1 5 [0,19] [7,8] [0,19]
{ (set field1 10),
(goto 2) }
1 6 [0,19] [6,8] [0,19] { (forward) }
2 [10,12] [0,19] [0,12] [0,19]
{ (set field3 6),
(forward) }
Table 4.2: Example OpenFlow rule set used to illustrate coverage and modify viola-
tions
necessary to verify all flow tables within the OF-network. Table 4.2 is a simple
instance of our proposed flow rule set model with no overlaps. For simplicity, we de-
note IP addresses as non-negative integers and provide a formal definition of our OF
flow rule set in Section 4.6.2.3. Each entry of the flow rule set consists of conditions
over defined fields and a set of actions. We assume that if a given packet matches
all conditions of multiple entries, any set of actions corresponding to the matching
entry may be performed.
FRESCO SEK-FM addresses two types of violations of the non-bypass security
property that may be present in an OF flow rule set instance. For the first type of
violation, we assume that Table 4.2 is evaluated against the following non-bypass
property: every packet that goes from source IP [5,6] to destination IP 6 must be
dropped. However, an OF switch using Table 4.2 will forward any packet that has 6
for both the source and destination IP address because of the third entry in the first
flow table. That is, the final action for every packet satisfying the conditions of a
given non-bypass property is inconsistent with the action of the property (and thus
some packets can bypass the constraints). We call this kind of misconfiguration a
coverage violation.
The second type of violation arises due to the set command in an OF flow table.
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In this example, we define another non-bypass property such that every packet which
goes from source IP address 5 to destination IP address 6 must be dropped. However,
an adversary may tunnel the packet through a series of one or more intermediate
receivers such that the transmission chain originates from IP address 5 and ends
at destination IP address 6, which is a violation of the non-bypass property. For
example, when an adversary sends a malicious packet p whose source and destination
IP addresses are 5 and 7 respectively, the packet p is changed into p′ that goes from
source IP 10 to destination IP 6. Then, the packet p′ is forwarded to another switch
or the host whose IP address is 6 by the first rule of flow table 2. Thus, packet
p′ which originates from source IP 5 finally arrives at destination IP 6, which is a
clear violation of the specified property. We call this type of violation a modify
violation.
4.6.2.2 SMT Solving in Yices
Yices is a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver, developed at SRI. The core
of Yices implements an efficient SAT solver based on the Davis-Putnam-Logemann-
Loveland (DPLL) algorithm [23]. Yices is provided with an input file modeling given
first order logic. If a given model is satisfiable, i.e., there exists at least one instance
satisfying all model constraints, Yices outputs such a satisfying example. Otherwise,
Yices reports the model to be unsatisfiable. We leverage the soundness of Yices and
its ability to efficiently find satisfying examples, to verify flow rule sets.
4.6.2.3 Non-bypass Property Representation
A non-bypass security property asserts a feature within a given flow rule set.
Formally, a non-bypass security property is a form of first order logic consisting of
universal quantifier, conditions and an action. An action can be forward or drop.
The conditions part of a non-bypass security property is a conjunction of boolean
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expressions over flow rule set fields. The maximum number of fields is up to 15 [70].
The condition for each field is encoded with a boolean expression specifying a range
of non-negative integers because every field consists of a number of bits whose length
varies from 3 to 64.
To assert non-bypass properties within a flow rule set against coverage and mod-
ify violations, FRESCO SEK-FM uses two forms of non-bypass security properties,
respectively. The formal representation of a non-bypass property denoting that a
flow rule set is free from coverage violations is as follows:
Non-bypass propertyc = ∀p(
n∧
j=1
Cj(p)→ a), a ∈ {forward, drop}
Cj(p) = Fj(p) ∈ [iLowj , iHighj ], Fj(p) = j th field of p
This property denotes that if an initial packet, before modification by an OF-
switch, matches the conditions then its final result must be consistent with the
action of the property.
The formal representation of a non-bypass property proving that a flow rule set
has no modify violation is as follows:
Non-bypass propertym = ∀(p, p′)(
2∧
j=1
Cj(p)
n∧
k=3
Ck(p
′)→ a),
a ∈ {forward, drop}
(p, p′) = a pair of initial packet p and its final packet p′
F1(p) = source IP field of packet p, F2(p) = source port field of packet p
This property dictates that if the initial packet p before modification by an OF-
switch matches the source IP and port conditions and its final packet p′ matches
the remaining conditions of the property then, the final result for packet p must be
consistent with the action specified by the property.
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We assume that the administrator of an OF network has a priori knowledge of
what non-bypass properties must be enforced within the network. FRESCO SEK-
FM checks whether the specified non-bypass properties hold for the rule evaluation
sequence imposed by the switch.
4.7 Working Examples
We show two case studies by creating real working security applications written
in FRESCO script.
4.7.1 Implementing Reflector Net
FRESCO’s power stems from its ability to use OpenFlow to effectively reprogram
the underlying network infrastructure to defend the network against an emerging
threat. To illustrate this notion, consider a FRESCO application that allows OF
network operators to redirect malicious scanners to a third-party remote honeypot.
Using FRESCO script, we compose two modules that first detect an active malicious
scanner, and then reprogram the switch data plane to redirect all the scanner’s flow
into a remote honeynet. We refer to our composed security service as a threat re-
flector net, which effectively turns the address space of any OpenFlow network that
deploys this service into a contact surface for a remote high-interaction honeypot.
The incentive for an operator to use such a service is that the forensic evidence col-
lected by the honeypot can be shared back for the purpose of refining the operator’s
local FRESCO-based firewall.
First, we create and configure a simple threshold-based scan detector instance.
Since FRESCO already provides a “ScanDetector” module, we can instantiate an
instance from this module for selecting malicious external targets. For this example,
let us assume that our scan analysis is triggered by an external entity producing large
numbers of failed TCP connections. Thus, we establish TCP CONNECTION FAIL,
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which is captured in FRESCO’s native DB service, as an input trigger event for our
scan detection, which outputs a scan detection event when a threshold number of
failed connections is observed.
Our FRESCO script instantiates the scan detection module using four key script
variables: (i) input, (ii) output, (iii) parameter, and (iv) action. The input for this
instance is a source IP address for a flow that causes TCP CONNECTION FAIL
event. The parameter will determine a threshold value for a scan detection algo-
rithm, and here, we set this value as 5 (i.e., if a source IP generates five failed TCP
connections, we regard it as a scan attacker). The output is a source IP address
and a scan detection result (noted as scan result), which are delivered to the second
instance as input variables. The action variable is not defined here, as the logic
required to formulate and insert flow rules to incorporate duplex redirection is mod-
ularized into a second flow redirection instance. The FRESCO script for our flow
redirection instance is shown in Figure 4.5 (left).
We configure a redirector instance to redirect flows from the malicious scanner
to a honeynet (or forward benign flows). This function is an instance of FRESCO’s
“ActionHandler” module. This instance uses a PUSH event, which triggers the in-
stance each time “find scan” is outputted from the scan detection instance Finally,
we need to define an action to redirect flows produced by scan attackers. Thus, we
set the action variable of this instance as “scan result == 1 ? REDIRECT : FOR-
WARD”, which indicates that if the input variable of scan result equals 1 (denoting
the scanner) this instance redirects all flows related to the source IP address. The
FRESCO script for this instance is shown in Figure 4.5 (right).
We test this script in an OpenFlow simulation environment with Mininet [64],
which is commonly used to emulate OpenFlow networks, to show its real operation.
In this test, we created three hosts (scanner, target host, and honeynet) and an
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find_scan (1)(2){
type:ScanDetector
event:TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL
input:source_IP
output:source_IP, scan_result
parameter:5
/* no actions are defined */
action: -
}
do_redirect (2)(0){
type:ActionHandler
event:PUSH
input:source_IP, scan_result
output: -
parameter: -
/* if scan_result equals 1, redirect,
otherwise, forward */
action: scan_result == 1 ?
REDIRECT : FORWARD
}
Figure 4.5: FRESCO script with two connecting modules used to build a reflector
net
OpenFlow enabled switch. All three hosts are connected to the switch and able to
initiate flows to each another.
As illustrated in Figure 4.6, the malicious scanner (10.0.0.2) tries to scan the host
(10.0.0.4) using Nmap tool [68]. The scan packets are delivered through an Open-
Flow switch (1), where the switch then forwards the flow statistics to a FRESCO
application (i.e., find scan instance) through a controller. The find scan instance
determines that these packets are scan-related, and it sends the detection result to
the do redirect instance to instantiate flow rules to redirect these packets to our
honeynet (10.0.0.3) (2). At this time, the network configuration of the honeypot is
different from the original scanned machine (10.0.0.4), which opens network port 445
while the honeypot opens network port 444. Then, the honeypot returns packets to
the scanner as if it is the original target (3). Finally, the scanner receives packet
responses from the honeypot (4), unaware that all of its flows are now redirected to
and from the honeynet.
4.7.2 Cooperating with a Legacy Security Application
FRESCO provides an interface, which receives messages from legacy security
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Figure 4.6: Operational illustration of a FRESCO reflector net application
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applications, such as Snort [89] and BotHunter [34]. Usually, we use these network
security applications to monitor our networks, often using DPI-based techniques
to identify malicious traffic content or by simply monitoring flow patterns. Using
FRESCO, alerts produced from such network security monitors can be integrated
into the flow rule production logic of OF-enabled networks. To do this, we employ
FRESCO actions (e.g., drop and redirect) as responses against network attacks.
One might consider reimplementing classic network security applications directly
as OpenFlow applications. However, such efforts are both costly in engineering time
and subject to limitations in the availability of data provided by the OF controller.
Also, OpenFlow does not export full packet content over its APIs, so DPI-based
security services must be implemented as external applications. To reduce the inte-
gration burden, FRESCO provides a function of receiving messages from third-party
security applications, and we can simply design response strategies based on the
messages through FRESCO script.
A message from a third-party security application will be delivered to a mod-
ule as a type of event - MESSAGE LEGACY, and the format of a message is of
two kinds: (i) FRESCO type and (ii) other standardized formats such as the intru-
sion detection message exchange format (IDMEF) [78]. If we use FRESCO type,
it is notified in the event as a keyword of FRESCO, and it can be represented
as MESSAGE LEGACY:FRESCO. If we use IDMEF, it can be shown as MES-
SAGE LEGACY:IDMEF.
In the scenario, shown in Figure 4.7, an attacker sends a bot binary (1) to the host
C, and BotHunter responds by producing an infection profile (2). Then, BotHunter
reports this information (i.e., the Victim IP and forensic confidence score for the
infection) to a security application written in FRESCO script (3). If the profile’s
forensic score achieves a threshold value, the application imposes a quarantine action
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on the victim IP. The quarantine module uses the FRESCO SEK to enforce a series
of flow rules that implement the quarantine action SEK (4, 5). Finally, if an infected
host (the host C) sends another malicious data to other hosts, such as host A or host
B (6), it is automatically blocked by the switch.
Figure 4.7: Operational illustration of a FRESCO actuator cooperating with BotH-
unter
To implement this function, we simply reconfigure the “do quarantine” instance
(or create another instance) used in the above example scenario for this case. This
time, we instantiate the instance with four alternate variables: (i) event, (ii) in-
put, (iii) parameter, and (iv) condition part of action. When BotHunter forwards
its infection alarm using the FRESCO API, we set the event variable as MES-
SAGE LEGACY:FRESCO. The input variables passed to this module include the
victim ip (reported as infected by BotHunter), and the infection confidence score,
which represents the degree of forensic evidence recorded within the infection profile.
We also specify a parameter for the confidence threshold, and trigger the QUAR-
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ANTINE action when the confidence score exceeds the confidence threshold. The
FRESCO script for this instance is shown in Figure 4.8.
do_quarantine (2)(0){
type:ActionHandler
event:MESSAGE_LEGACY:FRESCO
input:victim_ip,confidence_score
output: -
parameter:confidence_threshold
/* redirect all flows from source IP */
action:confidence_score > confidence_threshold
? QUARANTINE(victim_ip)
}
Figure 4.8: FRESCO script for invoking host quarantine for BotHunter
4.8 Implementation
We have developed a prototype implementation of the FRESCO architecture.
The FRESCO Application Layer prototype is implemented in Python and runs as
an OpenFlow application on NOX. The prototype operates on NOX version 0.5.0
using the OpenFlow 1.1.0 protocol, and is implemented in approximately 3,000 lines
of Python. FRESCO modules are implemented as independent Python objects, and
inputs and parameters of a module are input variables to the Python object. The
return values of a Python object are considered as output values of a module.
A sample implementation of the FRESCO Comparator module, used in Figure
4.2 (right), is presented in Figure 4.9. All modules in FRESCO start with the
function of module start, and this function has two arguments: (i) input dic, which
is a dictionary data structure containing F-DB, event, and input values, and (ii)
param list, which is a list structure storing user-defined parameter values. All
variables starting with ”FR ” are FRESCO native variables. The developer fills in
106
additional specialized logic at the bottom of the module (lines 13-18).
1 def module_start(input_dic , param_list ):
2 # initialize FRESCO native inputs
3 FR_FDB = input_dic[’FR_FDB ’]
4 FR_event = in_dic[’FR_event ’]
5 FR_input = input_dic[’FR_input ’]
6
7 # initialize FRESCO variables
8 FR_ret_dic = {}
9 FR_ret_dic[’output ’] = []
10 FR_ret_dic[’action ’] = None
11
12 # start - user defined logic
13 if param_list [0] == FR_input [0]:
14 output = 1
15 else:
16 output = 0
17
18 FR_ret_dic[’output ’]. append(output)
19 # end - user defined logic
20
21 return FR_ret_dic
Figure 4.9: FRESCO comparator module
The FRESCO SEK is implemented as a native C++ extension of the NOX source
code in approximately 1160 lines of C++ code. We modified the send openflow command
function, whose main operation is to send OpenFlow commands to network switches,
to capture flow rules from all OpenFlow applications. FRESCO SEK intercepts flow
rules in the function and stores them into the security constraints table if the rules
are from FRESCO applications (i.e., flow rules produced through the FRESCO path
are considered trusted flow rules and are preserved as active network security con-
straints). If a flow rule is from a non-FRESCO application, FRESCO SEK evaluates
the rule to determine if a conflict exists within its security constraints table. The
match algorithm is specifically optimized to perform the least-expensive comparisons
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first. If there are conflicts, an error message is returned to the OF application. Oth-
erwise, the rule is forwarded to the network switches. We implement and evaluate
the security constraint table using the in-memory database opportunistic best-fit
comparison algorithm, which reports an ability to execute queries in near-constant
lookup time.
4.9 System Evaluation
We now evaluate the FRESCO framework with respect to its ease of use, flexi-
bility, and security constraints preservation. To evaluate components in FRESCO,
we employ mininet [64], which provides a rapid prototyping environment for the
emulation of OpenFlow network switches. Using mininet, we have emulated one
OpenFlow network switch, three hosts connected to the switch, and one host to op-
erate our NOX controller. We perform flow generation by selecting one or two hosts
to initiate TCP or UDP connections. The remaining host is employed as a medium
interaction server, which responds to client application setup requests. We hosted
our evaluation environment on an Intel i3 CPU with 4 GB of memory. In addition,
we conduct live performance evaluations of the FRESCO SEK using an HP ProCurve
6600 OF-enabled switch in a test network laboratory.
4.9.1 Evaluating Modularity and Composability
For the evaluation, we begin with the basic problem of identifying entities per-
forming flow patterns indicative of malicious network scanning, and compare schemes
of implementing network scanning attacks with and without the use of FRESCO.
While network scanning is a well-studied problem in the network security realm,
it offers an opportunity to examine the efficiency of entity tracking using FRESCO.
Many well-established algorithms for scan detection exist [48, 47, 82]. However,
under OpenFlow, the potential for FRESCO to dynamically manipulate the switch’s
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data path in reaction to malicious scans is a natural objective. This scenario also
lets us examine how simple modules can be composed to perform data collection,
evaluation, and response.
1. FRESCO Scan Deflector Service. Figure 4.10 illustrates how FRESCO
modules and their connections can be linked together to implement a malicious scan
deflector for OpenFlow environments. This scan detection function consists of the
three modules described above. First, we have a module for looking up a blacklist.
This module checks a blacklist table to learn whether or not an input source IP is
listed. If the table contains the source IP, the module notifies its presence to the
second module. Based on the input value, the second module performs threshold-
based scan detection or it drops a packet. If it does not drop the packet, it notifies
the detection result to the third module. In addition, this second module receives
a parameter value that will be used to determine the threshold. Finally, the third
module performs two actions based on input. If the input is 1, the module redirects
a packet. If the input is 0, it forwards a packet. Implementing the three modules
required 205 lines of Python code and 24 lines of FRESCO script (this script is shown
in Figure 4.11).
Figure 4.10: FRESCO composition of a scan deflector
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1 blacklist_check (1)(1){
2 type:TableLookup
3 event:TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL,
TCP_CONNECTION_SUCCESS
4 input:source_IP
5 output:blacklist_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 find_scan (1)(1){
2 type:ScanDetector
3 event:PUSH
4 input:blacklist_out
5 output:scan_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:blacklist_out == 1
?DROP
8 }
1 do_action (1)(0){
2 type:ActionHandler
3 event:PUSH
4 input:scan_out
5 output:-
6 parameter:-
7 action:scan_out == 1
?REDIRECT:FORWARD
8 }
Figure 4.11: FRESCO script for a scan detector
2. FRESCO BotMiner Service. To illustrate a more complex flow analysis
module using FRESCO, we have implemented a FRESCO version of the BotMiner
[33] application. Note that our goal here is not faithful, “bug-compatible” adherence
to the full BotMiner protocol described in [33], but rather to demonstrate feasibility
and to capture the essence of its implementation through FRESCO, in a manner
that is slightly simplified for readability.
Figure 4.12: FRESCO composition of the BotMiner service
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BotMiner detects bots through network-level flow analysis. We have implemented
the essentials of its detection functionality using five modules as shown in Figure 4.12.
BotMiner assumes that hosts infected with the same botnet exhibit similar patterns
at the network level, and these patterns are different from benign hosts. To find
similar patterns between bots, BotMiner clusters botnet activity in two dimensions
(C-plane and A-plane). The C-plane clustering approach is used to detect hosts that
resemble each other in terms of (packets per second) and bps (bytes per second). The
A-plane clustering identifies hosts that produce similar network anomalies. In this
implementation, we use the scan detector module to find network anomalies. Finally,
if we find two clusters, we perform co-clustering to find common hosts that exist in
both dimensions and label them as bots. BotMiner was implemented in 312 lines of
python code and 40 lines of FRESCO script (the script for BotMiner is presented in
Figure 4.13).
1 table_check (1)(2){
2 type:TableLookup
3 event:TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL,
TCP_CONNECTION_SUCCESS
4 input:source_IP
5 output:table_out,source_IP
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 a_cluster (2)(1){
2 type:A-PlaneCluster
3 event:PUSH
4 input:table_out,source_IP
5 output:a_cls_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
-
1 c_cluster (0)(1){
2 type:C-PlaneCluster
3 event:TCP_CONNECTION_FAIL,
TCP_CONNECTION_SUCCESS
4 input:-
5 output:c_cls_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 cr_cluster (2)(2){
2 type:CrossCluster
3 event:PUSH
4 input:a_cls_out,c_cls_out
5 output:cross_out,ip_list
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
-
1 do_action (2)(0){
2 type:ActionHandler
3 event:PUSH
4 input:cross_out,ip_list
5 output:-
6 parameter:-
7 action:cross_out == 1
?DROP(ip_list):FORWARD
8 }
Figure 4.13: FRESCO scripts illustrating composition of the BotMiner service
3. FRESCO P2P Plotter Service. We have implemented a FRESCO-based
P2P malware detection service, similarly implemented to capture the concept of
111
the algorithm, but simplified for the purpose of readability. Motivated by Yen’s
work [109], we have implemented the P2P malware detection algorithm, referred to
as P2P Plotter, using FRESCO. The P2P Plotter asserts that P2P malware has
two interesting characteristics, which are quite different from normal P2P client
programs. First, P2P malware usually operates at lower volumes of network flow
interactions than what is typically observed in benign P2P protocols. Second, P2P
malware typically interacts with a peer population that has a lower churn rate (i.e.,
the connection duration time of P2P plotters is longer than that of normal P2P
clients). The algorithm operates by performing co-clustering, to find common hosts
that exhibit both characteristics (i.e., low volume and low churn rate).
Figure 4.14: FRESCO composition of the P2P plotter
112
We have implemented this essential functionality of the P2P Plotter algorithm as
a 4-module FRESCO script, which is shown in Figure 4.14. This involved 227 lines of
Python code and 32 lines of FRESCO script. The script for the P2P Plotter is illus-
trated in Figure 4.15. The reuse of modules (i.e., CrossCluster and ActionHandler,
from the BotMiner service implementation is noteworthy, highlighting the reuse po-
tential of FRESCO modules.
1 low_volume_peer (0)(1){
2 type:VolumeDetector
3 event:INCOMING_FLOW
4 input:-
5 output:volume_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 low_churn_peer (0)(1){
2 type:ChurnDetector
3 event:INCOMING_FLOW
4 input:-
5 output:churn_out
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 cr_cluster (2)(2){
2 type:CrossCluster
3 event:PUSH
4 input:volume_out,churn_out
5 output:cross_out,ip_list
6 parameter:-
7 action:-
8 }
1 do_action (2)(0){
2 type:ActionHandler
3 event:PUSH
4 input:cross_out,ip_list
5 output:-
6 parameter:-
7 action:cross_out == 1 ? DROP(ip_list):FORWARD
8 }
Figure 4.15: FRESCO scripts illustrating composition of the P2P plotter
4.9.2 Comparing FRESCO Applications with Non-FRESCO Detectors
Network anomaly detection approaches, e.g., TRW [48], have been well-studied
and are commonly used as a complement to signature-based detection systems in tra-
ditional networks. While these approaches may be instantiated as software programs
or in hardware devices, the common practice is to implement them as stand-alone
software programs. (We envision that the FRESCO development environment may
be similarly used for rapid prototyping and evaluation of certain anomaly detection
algorithms in OpenFlow networks.)
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To highlight the advantages of FRESCO, we first choose an open-source network
anomaly detection system and then replicate identical functionality using FRESCO.
Specifically, we compare FRESCO with a recently published work [63], where the au-
thors implemented popular network anomaly detection algorithms such as TRW-CB
[79] and Rate Limit [98] as applications running on an OpenFlow network controller.
We re-implement the same algorithms (i.e., TRW-CB and Rate Limit) using existing
FRESCO modules and the FRESCO scripting language. We provide a comparison in
Table 4.3, in terms of the number of lines of source code, to demonstrate the utility
of the FRESCO development environment.
As summarized in Table 4.3, prior work [63] makes the case that its OpenFlow
application implementation is slightly simpler than the standard implementation
(i.e., the source code for the OpenFlow implementation is roughly 70% to 80% the
length of the standard implementation). Using FRESCO, we are able to realize
similar functionality with an order of magnitude fewer lines of code. That is, we
have implemented the identical TRW-CB function with 66 lines of code (58 lines of
Python and 8 lines of FRESCO script) and the rate limiting function with 69 lines
of code (61 lines of Python and 8 lines of FRESCO script). These two examples
represent 6% to 7% of the length of their standard implementations, and less than
9% of the recently published OpenFlow implementation.
Implementation
Algorithms Standard OpenFlow application FRESCO
TRW-CB 1,060 741 66 (58 + 8)
Rate Limit 991 814 69 (61 + 8)
Table 4.3: Source code length for standard, OpenFlow and FRESCO implementa-
tions of the TRW-CB and Rate-Limit anomaly detection algorithms
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4.9.3 Measuring and Evaluating FRESCO Overhead
FRESCO Application Layer Overhead. We compare the flow setup time
of NOX flow generation with five other FRESCO applications and summarize the
results in Table 4.4. To measure this, we capture packets between NOX and the
OpenFlow switch, and measure the round trip required to submit the flow and receive
a corresponding flow constraint. We observe that FRESCO applications require
additional setup time in the range of 0.5 milliseconds to 10.9 milliseconds.‡
NOX Simple Flow
Tracker
Simple Scan
Detector
Threshold Scan
Detector
BotMiner
Detector
P2P
Plotter
Time
(ms)
0.823 1.374 2.461 7.196 15.421 11.775
Table 4.4: Flow setup time comparison of NOX with five FRESCO applications
Resource Controller Overhead. The resource controller component monitors
switch status frequently and removes old flow rules to reclaim space for new flow
rules, which will be enforced by FRESCO applications. This job is performed by
FRESCO’s garbage collector, a subcomponent of the resource controller, which we
test under the following scenario. First, we let non-FRESCO applications enforce
4,000 flow rules to an OpenFlow network switch. In this case, we assume that the
maximum size of the flow table in the switch is 4,000, and we set the threshold
value(θ) for garbage collection as 0.75 (i.e., if the capacity of a flow table in a switch
is ≤ 75%, we run the garbage collector). Our test results, shown in Figure 4.16,
demonstrate that the garbage collector correctly implements its flow eviction policy.
‡These setup times were measured on mininet, which is an emulated environment running on a
virtual machine. If we use a more powerful host for the controller, which is the common case in an
OpenFlow network, this setup time will be reduced significantly.
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Figure 4.16: Operation of FRESCO garbage collector
4.10 Related Work
The OpenFlow standard has as its roots on a rich body of work on control-flow
separation and clean-slate design of the Internet (e.g., [17], [31]). SANE [18] and
Ethane [17] propose new architectures for securing enterprise networks. The SANE
[18] protection layer proposes a fork-lift (clean-slate) approach for upgrading enter-
prise network security that introduces a centralized server, i.e., domain controller,
to authenticate all elements in the network and grant access to services in the form
of capabilities that are enforced at each switch. Ethane [17] is a more practical and
backwards-compatible instantiation of SANE that requires no modification to end
hosts. Both studies may be considered as catalysts for the emergence of OpenFlow
and software-defined networking.
FRESCO is built over the foundations laid by these studies and shares a common
objective with these systems in that it seeks to improve enterprise security using
programmable network elements. However, FRESCO emphasizes composable secu-
rity, and applications that it enables are much more sophisticated than simple access
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control policies. In addition, the FRESCO SEK focuses on providing continued en-
forcement of potentially conflicting flow constraints imposed by FRESCO and other
OF applications. Thus, we consider our work as greatly complementary to existing
studies such as SANE and Ethane.
FRESCO’s focus is on the development of a holistic platform for specifying and
developing OF security applications and enforcement of security constraints gener-
ated by these applications. Prior work has addressed a part of this problem, i.e.,
development of new languages for specifying security policies. Nettle [100] is a new
language for managing OF switches that is based on functional reactive programming.
Frenetic [27] and Procera [101] provide declarative query language frameworks for
managing distributed OF switches, describing high-level packet-forwarding and spec-
ifying network policies. The OpenSAFE system provides a language framework for
enabling redirection of traffic to network monitoring devices [7]. In contrast to these
languages, the FRESCO development environment is specialized to serve the needs of
security applications. Specifically, FRESCO applications issue high-level security di-
rectives (e.g., REDIRECT, QUARANTINE, MIRROR), which are then translated into
OF-specific commands by the script-to-module translator. In addition, FRESCO ap-
plications require aggregate session and flow state information as well as directives
for asynchronous delivery of switch state information that is unavailable in standard
OF environments. Applications such as Random Host Mutation [44] are additional
motivating examples of candidate OF security applications whose development may
be accelerated using FRESCO.
The FRESCO security enforcement kernel is informed by prior research focused
on testing or verifying firewall and network device configuration [83, 25, 58, 59, 4, 105,
3], e.g., using Firewall Decision Diagrams (FDDs) [58] or test case generators [83,
25]. These studies do not deal with dynamic networks. More recently, header space
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analysis was proposed, which is a generic framework to express various network
misconfigurations and policy violations [50]. While HSA can in theory deal with
dynamic networks, the FRESCO SEK differs in that it is specialized to deal with
specific policy violations by OF applications, rule conflict detection, and dynamic
flow tunneling. Veriflow proposes to slice the OF network into equivalence classes to
efficiently check for invariant property violations [51]. The alias set rule reduction
algorithm used by FRESCO SEK is complementary to this approach.
We build our system on NOX, which is an open-source OF controller [36]. How-
ever, our methodology could be extended to other architectures like Beacon [71], Mae-
stro [13], and DevoFlow [65]. FlowVisor is a platform-independent OF controller that
uses network slicing to separate logical network planes, allowing multiple researchers
to run experiments safely and independently in the same production OpenFlow net-
work [85]. Our work differs from FlowVisor in several ways. First, FlowVisor cares
primarily about non-interference across different logical planes (slices) but does not
instantiate network security constraints within a slice. It is possible that an OF
application uses packet modification functions resulting in flow rules that are ap-
plied across multiple network switches within the same slice. In such cases, we need
a security enforcement kernel to resolve conflicts as described in Section 4.6. Sec-
ond, although FlowVisor improves security by separating the OF network into logical
planes, it does not provide analogous capabilities to FRESCO for building additional
security applications.
The need for better policy validation and enforcement mechanisms has been
touched on by prior and concurrent research efforts. NICE provides a model-checking
framework that uses symbolic execution for automating the testing of OpenFlow ap-
plications [16]. The Resonance architecture enables dynamic access control and mon-
itoring in SDN environments [67]. The FlowChecker system encodes OpenFlow flow
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tables into Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) and uses model checking [3] to verify se-
curity properties. However, the evaluation of FlowChecker does not consider handling
of set action commands, which we consider to be a significant distinguisher for Open-
Flow networks. More recently, researchers have proposed developing language ab-
stractions to guarantee consistency of flow updates in software-defined networks [77].
In contrast, our complementary work on the FRESCO security enforcement kernel
is focused on detection of rule update conflicts and security policy violations. The
Onix platform [54] provides a generalized API for managing a distributed control
plane in Software Defined Networks. The techniques and the strategies developed in
Onix for managing a distributed network information base are complementary and
can be integrated into FRESCO.
4.11 Summary of this Chapter
Despite the recent success of SDN, developing and deploying complex SDN secu-
rity services remains a significant challenge. We present FRESCO, a new application
development framework specifically designed to address this problem. We introduce
the FRESCO architecture and its integration with the NOX OpenFlow controller,
and present several illustrative security applications written in the FRESCO scripting
language. To empower FRESCO applications with the ability to produce enforceable
flow constraints that can defend the network as threats are detected, we present the
FRESCO security enforcement kernel. Our evaluations demonstrate that FRESCO
introduces minimal overhead and that it enables rapid creation of popular security
functions with significantly (over 90%) fewer lines of code. We believe that FRESCO
offers a powerful new framework for prototyping and delivering innovative security
applications into the rapidly evolving world of software-defined networks. We plan
to release all developed code as open source software to the SDN community.
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we present several techniques to protect our networks. First, we
analyze the infection trends of recent bot malware samples, and we provide several
new findings and insights based on the analysis results. For example, in this re-
search, we first propose a way of comparing multiple different botnet malware, and
it discovers many new things that have not shown before. In addition, we suggest
an way of predicting malware infection just based on known infection trends. This
approach is pretty simple, but it is promising in estimating which network is infected
by bot malware. We believe that our findings, insights, and the prediction method
help security researchers devise more intelligent malware defending systems.
Second, we design a bot malware detection system, and it can effectively detect
bot malware without adding serious overhead to our systems. This system first sifts
out benign processes, and it just focuses on some suspicious processes. After sifting
out, it uses several techniques to investigate the suspicious processes more to know
whether they are malicious or not. In our evaluation, we find that this system can
detect 15 well-known bot malware clearly, and it has very low false-positive rates.
Moreover, our test indicates that our system causes very little overhead (less than
2%) to each host, and it addresses the problem of existing host-based bot malware
detection systems.
Above two techniques are useful to defend our network from bot malware. How-
ever, there are much more diverse network threats, and we want to defend our net-
works from these threats. To achieve this, we try to design a new framework to
make our networks more secure. Since it is hard to change the architecture of exist-
ing networks, we have decided to use a new technology that can be used for a future
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network. We employ the Software Defined Networking (SDN) technology that is
considered as a key technology for future networks, and we realize our ideas with
this technology. In this context, we create a new security frame work for, and it is
FRESCO. With FRESCO, security researchers and network administrators can eas-
ily create intelligent security applications, and they can make their networks more
secure.
We will continue our research to make our networks more secure and to protect
them from advanced network threats. We will analyze more recent and diverse bot
malware samples and their infection trends to investigate their characteristics. Since
malware writers will keep developing new malware to attack our networks, we also
need to keep monitoring our networks to find new malware. Finding new malware
samples in the early stage is really important, because it will reduce the effect of
malware infection.
We will extend the EFFORT system to make this system more efficient and effec-
tive. We will consider more network and host level features to make detection more
effective. For example, EFFORT system currently investigates around 20 systems
calls to check whether a suspicious process conducts malicious operations or not. We
will add more systems calls (but not too much) for investigation, and they will help
EFFORT more malicious operations.
We will build more intelligent security applications for FRESCO. For example,
we will create some network anomaly detection applications running on FRESCO.
In addition, we will improve the performance of FRESCO, and it will promote the
usage of FRESCO applications in real networks.
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